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Triangular Taxation Relief: A Critical Evaluation of the New Zealand 
and Australian Governments’ Solution  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2002, the New Zealand and Australian governments released a joint 
discussion document,1 Trans-Tasman Triangular Tax.  The joint media statement 
noted that: 
Clearly, triangular tax reform requires a bilateral approach that 
preserves the Australian and New Zealand tax bases and is acceptable to 
business and government in both countries… The mechanism under 
consideration is one that allocates both Australian franking credits and 
New Zealand imputation credits to shareholders in proportion to their 
ownership of a company. 
This mechanism is known as the “pro rata allocation” model, and its adoption was 
confirmed in February 2003. 
The discussion document noted that the following alternative methods to relieve 
triangular taxation had been considered by both governments, but were rejected:  
? ? apportionment, 
? ? mutual recognition (including pro rata revenue sharing), 
? ? streaming. 
The Ministers2 invited interested parties to comment on the workability of the pro rata 
revenue sharing proposal, and said that their advice would be taken into account in 
deciding whether or not to proceed with this proposal.  
This working paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the pro rata allocation 
mechanism and contrasts that solution with the streaming alternative.  From the 
perspective of a New Zealand individual shareholder, the analysis will demonstrate 
the significant additional taxation advantages associated with streaming.  Accordingly 
it is possible that the latest initiative may not produce a feasible solution.  Trans-
Tasman companies may continue to devise tax-driven strategies that provide their 
individual shareholders with an after-tax rate of return which is comparable with what 
they would have received under the streaming model.   
Also examined, will be a range of debt, equity, and profit repatriation strategies which 
are currently used to solve triangular taxation.  These include floating special purpose 
subsidiaries, the use of hybrid instruments, and techniques to minimise Australian 
capital gains tax.  The pro rata allocation model is unlikely to lead to any significant 
decrease in Trans-Tasman tax-driven investment. 
                                               
1 Policy Advice Division of Inland Revenue, New Zealand and Department of the Treasury, Australia. 2002. Trans-Tasman 
triangular tax [Online]. 2002 [cited 20 February 2003]. Available from: 
http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/html/transtasman/index.html.  See also the media statement of 19 February 
2003 and the accompanying technical appendix which is also available in electronic format at 
http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt/publications/files/html/transtasman.html 
2 Dr Michael Cullen, New Zealand Minister of Finance and Mr Peter Costello, Australian Treasurer. 
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2. THE STORY SO FAR 
2.1 Previous analysis 
An article published in March 20023 analysed, inter alia, the tax advantages of the 
latest proposal (pro rata allocation) and the three alternatives that had already been 
rejected by both governments.  The following analysis is an update of the original 
hypothetical example which has been modified to reflect the comments contained in 
the discussion document.  This will demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
pro rata allocation and streaming models. 
2.2 The hypothetical example 
Diagram 1 is based on the example in the discussion document.4  For ease of 
comparison, the example has adopted a 30% corporate rate of tax in both New 
Zealand and Australia.5  However, New Zealand’s existing rate will not change in the 
foreseeable future.   
Diagram 1 
 
 
 
 
 $700 Cash $700 Cash 
 $300 Franking credits 50% 50% $300 Franking credits 
 $225 Imputation credits   $225 Imputation credits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  62.5%  37.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the purposes of comparison, Australian Parent Company (Aust Parent Co) is a 
resident of Australia for tax purposes.  New Zealand resident shareholders own 50% 
of the share capital.  The remaining 50% of the share capital of Aust Parent Co is 
owned by Australian resident shareholders.   
                                               
3 DG Dunbar, “Trans-Tasman taxation reform : will it be third time lucky or will history repeat itself?”  (2002) Vol 8: No 1 New 
Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy pp 93-122. 
4 Policy Advice Division of Inland Revenue, New Zealand and Department of the Treasury, Australia. 2002. Trans-Tasman 
triangular tax [Online]. 2002 [cited 20 February 2003]. Available from: 
http://www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/files/html/transtasman/index.html    p.19. 
5 Australian rate of corporate tax was cut to 30% on 1 July 2001.  The New Zealand rate will remain at 33%. 
Australian 
shareholder 
Aust Sub 
Aust income $2,500 
Aust tax $   750 
Net income $1,750 
New Zealand 
shareholder 
NZ Sub 
NZ income $1,500 
NZ tax $   450 
Net income $1,050 
Aust Parent Co 50% distribution policy ($1,400) 
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Aust Parent Co owns 100% of the capital of an Australian resident operating 
subsidiary (Aust Sub) and a New Zealand resident operating subsidiary (NZ Sub). NZ 
Sub derived $1,500 of New Zealand source income and paid New Zealand company 
tax of $450.  The after-tax income of $1,050 is paid as a dividend (including a 
supplementary dividend) to Aust Parent Co.  
In addition to the net New Zealand cash dividend of $1,050, Aust Parent Co derives a 
dividend from its Australian operating company of $1,750.  That subsidiary has an 
Australian sourced pre-tax income of $2,500 and pays Australian company tax of 
$750.   
2.3 An important issue is the extent to which the hypothetical scenario modelled in 
Diagram 1 reflects the actual pattern of Trans-Tasman ownership.  In cases where 
Australian resident shareholders dominate the ownership of an Aust Parent Co, there 
would appear to be few (if any) incentives for this type of company to support the pro 
rata allocation model.  Australian shareholders own approximately 95% of ATA, 
AGL, ANZ, Goodman Fielder Wattie, NAB, Telstra and Westpac. 
Under the pro rata allocation model at least 95% of the available imputation credits 
would be allocated to shareholders who were unable to utilise them. 
2.4 The NZ corporate tax base relies heavily on the finance and business services 
sector which is dominated by Australian owned companies.  In a paper presented by 
Robin Oliver (General Manager Policy) to the 2000 PricewaterhouseCoopers TLS 
conference, he noted that in 1998 approximately 40% of business income tax was paid 
by this sector.  Three of New Zealand’s four largest trading banks are dominated by 
Australian shareholders who are unlikely to support a model that does not provide 
them with a material improvement in their after tax dividend income.  
3. THE PRO RATA ALLOCATION OPTION  
3.1 Parent company’s perspective 
Table 1 (p.7) summarises the key changes associated with this proposal.  It is based on 
the analysis contained in the discussion document summarised in 2.2 above.  Under 
existing law, the dividend received by individual New Zealand shareholders would 
only contain an Australian imputation credit.  However, the individual New Zealand 
shareholder cannot use that credit to offset against their New Zealand personal income 
tax liability.  Under the proposal, New Zealand imputation credits could also be 
attached to the dividend.  The imputation credit would be attached according to the 
shareholding, which in this example is 50%.  The dividend received by the individual 
New Zealand shareholder would contain two credits.  However, the shareholder can 
only utilise the imputation credit.  Accordingly, franking credits allocated to New 
Zealand shareholders are effectively lost or wasted under both the current law and this 
proposal.   
To achieve this proposed outcome, the Aust Parent Co would be permitted to maintain 
an imputation credit account which would record as a credit the $450 New Zealand 
company tax paid by the New Zealand operating subsidiary.  The imputation account 
would record as a debit the allocation to the Australian shareholders of $225 and a 
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similar allocation to the New Zealand shareholders.  To enable Aust Parent Co to 
distribute the tax paid by its two lower-tier operating subsidiaries, each subsidiary 
would have to pay a dividend with the respective credit attached.  This requirement 
would be consistent with the current imputation and franking credit regimes.    
Table 1 – Pro-rata allocation: The company’s perspective 
Distribution NPBT* NPAT** Cash 
dividend 
Imputation 
credit 
Franking 
credit 
Additional 
benefit 
New Zealand 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 700 225 300 225 
Australian 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 700 225 300 Nil 
 4,000 2,800 1,400 450 600 225 
50% Distribution of NPAT 
 
3.2 The shareholders’ perspective 
Table 2 (p.7) summarises the major changes associated with this proposal.  The key 
point to note is that there would be no additional benefit for the Australian 
shareholders.  The New Zealand shareholders would derive a significant benefit via 
their access to 50% of the imputation credits.  The increase in the after-tax dividend 
from $427 to $564 represents a reduction in the effective tax rate from approximately 
57% to approximately 44%.  Despite this improvement in the after-tax return, the 
effective tax rate is still above 39%.  This would occur because the dividend is not 
fully imputed.  Figure 1 discloses that the Aust Parent Co would derive 62.5% of its 
earnings from its Australian operating subsidiary.  Accordingly, the dividend derived 
by the individual New Zealand shareholders would partly be sourced from Australian 
income with Australian company tax paid on that income.   
In view of the fact that Australian shareholders dominate the ownership of companies 
such as AXA Limited, AMP Limited, Westpac Limited, ANZ Banking Group 
Limited, why would those companies seriously consider implementing the pro rata 
allocation option?  It would involve additional compliance and regulatory costs with 
no discernible benefit for their Australian shareholders. 
Table 2 – Pro-rata allocation: The shareholders’ perspective 
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New 
Zealand 
shareholder 
37% tax rate 
700 225 300 1,225 925 361 (225) Nil 136 564 137 
Australian 
shareholder 
48.5% tax 
rate 
700 225 300 1,225 1,000 485 Nil (300) 185 515 Nil 
Total 1,400 450 600 2,450 1,925 846 (225) (300) 321 1,079 137 
50% Distribution of NPAT 
*NPBT = Net Profit Before Tax 
**NPAT = Net Profit After Tax 
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3.3 Full distribution of net profit after tax 
Table 3 (p.8) and Table 4 (p.9) show the advantages that would be associated with the 
pro rata allocation option if Aust Parent Co were to distribute all of its net profit after 
tax (NPAT).  Once again, the only shareholders who would derive any benefit in this 
scenario are the 50% New Zealanders who would receive 50% of the available 
imputation credits. There would be no improvement in the tax position of the 50% 
Australian shareholders.  This outcome raises serious doubts about the viability of the 
pro rata solution.  The joint discussion document invited interested parties to make 
submissions.  A number of submissions expressed doubts about the suitability of the 
pro rata model.  For example the submission from KPMG Australia and New 
Zealand: 
We have serious misgivings that [sic] the proposals will meet their 
objectives.  We would expect that the adoption of the preferred model by 
corporates will be low due to its limited benefit as compared to its 
complexity and hence likely relatively high compliance costs (p.4). 
Tables 2 and 4 illustrate the two kinds of tax leakage associated with this option.  The 
first is the 50% allocation of the available imputation and franking credits to 
shareholders that are unable to utilise them.  The second is the relationship between 
the source of Aust Parent Co’s income and its distribution policy. 
Aust Parent Co derives 62.5% of its income from Australian sources and 37.5% from 
sources in New Zealand.  Aust Parent Co distributes either 50% or 100% of its net 
profit after tax.  The percentage of profits distributed to the 50% New Zealand 
shareholders is significantly higher than the 37.5% profit generated from sources 
within New Zealand.  Consequently, the 50% New Zealand shareholders will only 
receive a partially imputed dividend. 
If for example Aust Parent Co was owned entirely by New Zealand shareholders, they 
would receive a cash dividend of $2,800 with, inter alia, an imputation credit of $450 
(which is equal to the total New Zealand company tax paid by the New Zealand 
operating subsidiary).  To pay a fully imputed dividend to the 100% New Zealand 
shareholders would require $1,200 of imputation credits.  This extreme example 
illustrates the relationship between the additional benefit an investor will obtain from 
this solution and the percentage of income derived by the parent company from the 
investors’ home jurisdiction.  This is also a feature of the full streaming alternative 
solution.   
 
Table 3 – Pro-rata allocation: The company’s perspective 
Distribution NPBT NPAT Cash 
dividend 
Imputation 
credit 
Franking 
credit 
Additional 
benefit 
New Zealand 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 1,400 225 375 225 
Australian 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 1,400 225 375 Nil 
 4,000 2,800 2,800 450 750 225 
100% Distribution of NPAT 
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Table 4 – Pro-rata allocation: the shareholders’ perspective 
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New 
Zealand 
shareholder 
37% tax rate 
1,400 225 375 2,000 1,625 635 (225) Nil 410 990 225 
Australian 
shareholder 
48.5% tax 
rate 
1,400 225 375 2,000 1,775 860 Nil (375) 485 915 Nil 
Total 2,800 450 750 4,000 3,400 1,495 (225) (375) 895 1,905 225 
100% Distribution of NPAT 
3.4 Creditable taxes 
Both governments have agreed that any withholding taxes imposed by the other 
country will also create a credit in the relevant company’s tracking account of taxes 
paid in the other jurisdiction.  In the context of the hypothetical example, Aust Parent 
Co would maintain an imputation account which could also credit any non-resident 
withholding tax (NRWT) on interest, royalties and dividends.  Furthermore, any non-
resident contractor’s withholding tax would also create an imputation credit.  
However, the payment of any approved issuer levy (AIL) would not create a credit to 
the imputation account.  This distinction is conceptually correct, but has been applied 
inconsistently.  AIL is not a tax liability of the Aust Parent Co.  AIL is the liability of 
the New Zealand subsidiary, whereas the other withholding taxes are deductions on 
account of the Aust Parent Co’s New Zealand tax liability.  However, the proposed 
treatment of AIL is inconsistent because the underlying company tax is not a liability 
of the Aust Parent Co yet it will be creditable. 
Foreign sourced dividends derived by New Zealand resident companies are subject to 
the foreign dividend withholding payment regime (FDWP).  New Zealand companies 
that receive foreign dividends are not required to maintain a FDWP account.  A 
company which elects to maintain a dividend withholding payment credit account is 
able to attach to a dividend, a dividend withholding payment credit.  That credit is 
refundable to the extent it exceeds the New Zealand tax liability on that dividend.  
In the case of an Aust Parent Co which received a dividend from a New Zealand 
subsidiary with a dividend withholding payment credit attached, the discussion 
document proposes that it6 would receive the usual refund and that the non-resident 
withholding tax could then be credited to the Australian Parent Co’s imputation credit 
account.  If the New Zealand subsidiary did not maintain a dividend withholding 
payment account, then the Aust Parent Co would not receive a cash refund, but it 
would be able to credit its imputation account with the full amount of the dividend 
withholding payment credit. 
 
                                               
6 See n 1, pp 25-27. 
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4. FULL STREAMING 
4.1 The parent company’s perspective 
One of the major criticisms of the pro rata allocation option is that it will force a 
parent company to allocate its available imputation and franking credits to individual 
shareholders that are unable to utilise them.  Tables 2 and 4 demonstrate why an 
individual Australian shareholder is likely to be indifferent towards pro rata 
allocation.  Only the individual New Zealand resident shareholders benefit from that 
option. 
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the additional benefit that would arise were the Australian 
Parent Co to allocate all of its imputation credits to its individual New Zealand 
resident shareholders and the corresponding franking credits to its individual 
Australian shareholders.  The Australian shareholders would receive an additional 
$300 franking credit at 50% allocation of NPAT.  This benefit would justify the extra 
compliance and administration costs associated with implementing this option.  
 
 
Table 5 – Full streaming: The company’s perspective 
 
Distribution NPBT NPAT Cash 
dividend 
Imputation 
credit 
Franking 
credit 
Additional 
benefit 
New Zealand 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 700 300 Nil 300 
Australian 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 700 Nil 300 Nil 
 4,000 2,800 1400 300 300 300 
50% Allocation of NPAT 
 
Table 6 – Full streaming: The company’s perspective 
 
Distribution NPBT NPAT Cash 
dividend 
Imputation 
credit 
Franking 
credit 
Additional 
benefit 
New Zealand 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 1,400 450 Nil 450 
Australian 
shareholder 
2,000 1,400 1,400 Nil 600 300 
 4,000 2,800 2,800 450 600 750 
100% Allocation of NPAT 
4.2 The shareholders’ perspective 
Tables 7 and 8 illustrate why both individual resident New Zealand and Australian 
shareholders would support this option. If Aust Parent Co were to distribute 50% of 
its NPAT, the individual New Zealand resident shareholders would receive a fully 
imputed dividend.  Secondly, Table 8 demonstrates that a full distribution by Aust 
Parent Co of its NPAT would result in the allocation to its individual New Zealand 
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resident shareholders of all New Zealand company tax paid by the New Zealand Sub 
(see Diagram 1).  Note however that the amount of New Zealand tax ($450) is 
insufficient to enable Aust Parent Co to fully impute the cash dividend of $1,400.   
 
 
Table 7 – Full streaming: The shareholders’ perspective 
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New 
Zealand 
shareholder 
39% tax rate 
700 300 Nil 1,000 1,000 390 (300) Nil 90 610 300 
Australian 
shareholder 
48.5% tax 
rate 
700 Nil 300 1,000 1,000 485 Nil (300) 185 515 Nil 
Total 1,400 300 300 2,000 2,000 875 (300) (300) 275 1,125 300 
50% Distribution of NPAT 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Full streaming: The shareholders’ perspective 
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New Zealand 
shareholder 
39% tax rate 
1,400 450 Nil 1,850 1,850 720 (450) Nil 270 1,130 450 
Australian 
shareholder 
48.5% tax rate 
1,400 Nil 600 2,000 2,000 970 Nil (600) 370 1,030 300 
Total 2,800 450 600 3,850 3,850 1,690 (450) (600) 640 2,160 750 
100% Distribution of NPAT 
 
This occurs because the New Zealand operating subsidiary NPAT is $1,050 and the 
available imputation credits of $450 cannot cover a cash dividend of $1,400.  This 
outcome will always occur when the percentage of profits distributed (i.e. 50% or 
100%) exceeds the percentage of profits derived from a particular jurisdiction (NZ 
37.5%).  Conversely, in cases where the percentage of profits distributed is less than 
or equal to the percentage of profits received from New Zealand, the individual New 
Zealand shareholders should receive a fully imputed dividend. 
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5. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The combined effect of the waste of credits associated with the pro rata allocation 
solution, its complexity and compliance costs will limit its appeal.  The Aust Parent 
Co in the hypothetical example considered in the discussion document has very few 
(if any) incentives to implement a solution which would only benefit its 50% New 
Zealand individual resident shareholders.  There is no benefit to the Australian 
individual shareholders and there would be inevitable compliance costs arising from 
any legislative solution that is based on the pro rata allocation model. 
The rejection by both Governments of the full streaming alternative is likely to see a 
continuation of the ad hoc solutions which achieve the same underlying benefits 
associated with the full streaming option.  Recent examples include: 
? ? capital-raising solutions, 
? ? equity instruments, 
? ? bonus issues, 
? ? computer software and management fees, 
? ? debt solutions, and 
? ? cross-border solutions. 
 
6. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONCERN WITH STREAMING 
6.1 The superiority of streaming 
The pro rata allocation model represents a significant improvement over the current 
regime.  However, under that model both types of credit are allocated to shareholders 
in proportion to their shareholding in the Aust Parent Co.  Credits are wasted, which 
means this is clearly an inefficient method of solving the triangular tax problem.  The 
full streaming option is superior because no tax credits are wasted since the credits are 
only allocated to the shareholders in the country in which the underlying corporate tax 
was paid.  The streaming model provides the maximum tax benefit to both groups of 
shareholders and it achieves the objective of ensuring that no double tax occurs in 
respect of the same income.  
6.2 Criticism of full streaming 
The discussion document7 outlines both governments’ concerns about the implications 
of adopting the streaming model. 
The main conceptual difficulty with the streaming model is that it provides tax 
benefits to the shareholders that are disproportionate to their shareholding.  This 
model is contrary to both Australia’s and New Zealand’s current imputation rules 
which provide for the allocation of credits in proportion to the shareholder’s interest 
in the relevant company. 
                                               
7 See n 1, pp 16-17. 
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Secondly, both governments have also stated they are concerned about the fiscal risks 
associated with the full streaming model because the available credits are allocated 
only to the shareholders of the country in which the underlying corporate tax was 
paid.  Consequently, the credits will be used to reduce the shareholders’ home country 
tax liability.  
Thirdly, both governments were concerned that the adoption of the full streaming 
alternative could be misinterpreted as a signal that the streaming of credits would 
become acceptable.  This would be contrary to one of the fundamental design features 
of both countries’ imputation rules, which is the prohibition on streaming credits to 
different groups of taxpayers based on their ability to utilise the credit. 
6.3 Allocation of credits that are disproportionate 
The respective governments’ concerns ignore the fundamental problem that the 
various methods attempt to solve.  Both countries’ imputation regimes seek to 
eliminate double taxation that would otherwise occur.  The streaming model achieves 
this objective whereas the pro rata allocation model will not eliminate double taxation.  
Its effect is highly dependent on the source of the underlying income derived by the 
parent company and the mix of domestic and foreign source income reflected in the 
dividend.  Under the streaming model, it is not possible for the shareholders of a 
company to receive a credit which is greater than the tax paid by the parent company 
(or a subsidiary).  In the case of New Zealand, the maximum imputation ratio of 33/67 
would apply.  The current equivalent Australian ratio is 30/70.  These mechanisms 
ensure that a shareholder could never receive a credit that is greater than the tax paid 
in their jurisdiction.   
6.4 Fiscal risks 
The discussion document merely notes that “both governments, however, are 
concerned about the fiscal risks of such a model, given that imputation credits would 
be allocated only to shareholders of countries in which the tax was paid”.8  
Unfortunately, no empirical or anecdotal evidence is referred to that supports this 
stance.  From a conceptual perspective, it is difficult to understand the basis of the 
respective governments’ concerns.  The streaming model would simply permit a 
resident individual shareholder to utilise the tax that has been paid in that country.  It 
is difficult to see how the streaming model could pose a threat to either country’s tax 
base.   
Secondly, the streaming model merely solves the waste of credits which occurs under 
the current regime and under the pro rata allocation model.  To the extent that the 
streaming model overcomes this problem, it can hardly be seen as putting the 
country’s tax base at risk.  It merely corrects a deficiency in the current law which 
does not occur in the case of a domestic investment.   
Both governments may have lost sight of the fact that the streaming model does not 
allocate different amounts of credit to different categories of shareholder based on 
their marginal rate.  It merely allocates the same level of credit to all shareholders in 
the relevant country, which is also a feature of a similar domestic equity investment. 
                                               
8 See n 1, p 16. 
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6.5 Anti-streaming rules 
6.5.1 Historical background 
The third and final concern with the full streaming model is that it could be 
incorrectly construed as an indication that the streaming of credits to shareholders 
(based on their marginal rate) had now become acceptable.  In the case of New 
Zealand this is not a valid concern.  The Report of the Consultative Committee on Full 
Imputation of April 1988 noted that from an imputation perspective there were no 
policy reasons to prevent the allocation of credits to New Zealand resident 
shareholders.  
Where a New Zealand company has an overseas corporate shareholder 
and New Zealand shareholders hold shares in that overseas company, 
the New Zealand shareholders would not be able to receive credits for 
New Zealand taxes paid by the New Zealand subsidiary.  Some 
submissions argued that a non-resident company in these circumstances 
should be able to pass such credits through to its New Zealand 
shareholders. 
In terms of the imputation system itself, there would be no reason to deny 
this pass through of credits.9 
The consultative committee’s primary concern was not with the imputation regime but 
on ensuring that there were no “incentives” for companies to circumvent the 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and the foreign investment fund (FIF) regimes.  
The committee noted at pages 53-54 that a number of interested parties had submitted 
that a non-resident company should in certain circumstances be permitted to pass on 
imputation credits to its New Zealand shareholders.  The committee noted that from 
an imputation policy perspective there were no theoretical reasons to prevent, for 
example, National Australia Bank (NAB)/ Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) from passing 
imputation credits to its New Zealand resident individual shareholders.  The 
committee’s concern was that: 
The imputation system and the international tax reforms need to be 
mutually consistent and reinforcing.  A non-resident company can avoid 
the international tax regime by holding its non New Zealand interests 
through a non-resident subsidiary.  This advantage would be 
counterbalanced in part if such a company were not able to pass 
imputation credits through to its New Zealand shareholders.  For this 
reason, the Committee does not favour allowing non-resident companies 
to allocate credits to New Zealand resident shareholders. 
This passage clearly demonstrates the interrelationship between New Zealand’s 
international tax regime and the current imputation regime.  The designers of both 
regimes correctly noted the interrelationship and that, from a purely imputation 
perspective, there were no issues arising from the streaming of credits to alleviate 
triangular taxation.   
                                               
9 Report of the Consultative Committee on Full Imputation (Wellington, Government Printer, April 1988) pp 53-54. 
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Of greater concern are the significant changes in corporate ownership that have 
occurred since 1988.  For example, Lion Nathan and Goodman Fielder Wattie are no 
longer New Zealand resident companies and therefore the concerns about the impact 
of the CFC and FIF regime on these taxpayers no longer apply.   
Finally, the discussion document does not refer to the following anti-avoidance 
provisions that are designed to prevent the inappropriate use of the streaming model. 
6.5.2 New Zealand  
The primary mechanisms that prevent the streaming of imputation credits are the 
“benchmark dividend rule” and the maximum imputation ratio.  These two rules 
ensure that any imputation credit attached to a dividend cannot exceed the rate of 
underlying corporate tax paid by the company.   
Furthermore, the 66% continuity of shareholding rules ensure that the benefits of 
imputation credits only flow to those shareholders who incurred the risk associated 
with the economic ownership of the company.  Those rules are designed to prevent 
the trafficking of imputation credits.   
Additional legislative support is provided by the ratio declaration rules which ensure 
that the same ratio of imputation credit applies to all dividends paid by the company.  
Finally, there is a specific prohibition against trading in shares where the purpose of 
the arrangement is to provide a tax advantage to a shareholder.     
6.5.3 Australia 
The maximum franking ratio is similar to the New Zealand provision and it is also 
designed to ensure that any franking credits attached to a dividend do not exceed the 
rate of underlying tax paid by the company.   
The share class rule was introduced to, inter alia, prevent companies using legal (but 
commercially insignificant) distinctions between different classes of shares.  Under 
this rule, the shares in a company are treated as being of the same class if they have 
the same (or substantially the same) rights attached to those shares.   
Furthermore, there is a 45 day holding period rule which requires a person to hold 
shares at risk for more than 45 days in order to qualify for any franking benefit.  There 
is a 90 day rule which applies to certain classes of preference shares. 
Finally, the exposure draft on the new Business Tax Systems (Entity Taxation) Bill 
2000 proposes to introduce a benchmark dividend rule which is similar to the New 
Zealand provision.  This rule will provide that all frankable distributions made by a 
company in the subsequent six month period must not depart from the “benchmark 
dividend” ratio by more than 20%.   
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7. CAPITAL RAISING SOLUTION 
7.1 Introduction   
An obvious solution to triangular taxation is for an Aust Parent Co to incorporate a 
special purpose New Zealand subsidiary which pays a fully imputed dividend to the 
New Zealand shareholders (who previously held shares in the Aust Parent Co) but 
have become direct shareholders of the New Zealand subsidiary company.  The most 
significant example of this strategy is the recent $800 million successful capital-
raising undertaken by Westpac in late 1999.   
7.2 The Westpac share issue 
As part of the capital-raising exercise, Westpac obtained a binding product ruling 
from the Inland Revenue Department which stated, inter alia, that the proposed float 
did not contravene the specific anti-imputation streaming provisions contained in the 
Act or the general anti-avoidance provision.  The essential features of the proposal 
were described in Product Ruling BR 99/13.10  They can be summarised in the 
following diagram. 
Diagram 2 
A u s t r a l i a n  P u b l i c
9 8 . 8 %
W e s t p a c  A u s t r a l i a
W e s t p a c  H o l d i n g  “ P a r e n t ”
N e w  Z e a l a n d  
B r a n c h  r e t a i l  n e t w o r k
1 0 0 %
“ B o r r o w e r ” “ I s s u e r ”
P r o p e r t i e s
1 0 0 % $ 2 5 0  m i l l i o n
N e w  Z e a l a n d  H o l d e r s
1 . 2 %
$ 8 0 0  m i l l i o n
D e p o s i t /
I n t e r e s t
$ 8 0 0  m i l l i o n
L e a s e  o f  P r o p e r t i e s / R e n t
S w a p
 
                                               
10 Tax Information Bulletin Vol 11: No 10 (Nov 1999) pp 7-13.  This Binding Ruling was replaced with Product Ruling BR PDR 
02/14 reproduced in Tax Information Bulletin: Vol 14: No. 11 (Nov 2002). 
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7.3 Key features 
The commercial rationale for the float was the fact that Westpac carried on business 
as a branch, which meant that the New Zealand branch was unable to raise separate 
equity in New Zealand.  Secondly, there were significant commercial and regulatory 
constraints associated with any proposal to transfer the current branch operations into 
a separate company.  The diagram summarises the relationship between the additional 
equity and the existing branch retail operation.  The New Zealand operations of 
Westpac are predominantly conducted through a branch (the “Branch”), established 
by the Bank of New South Wales in 1861.  The capacity to raise ordinary equity in 
New Zealand is constrained by Westpac’s legal and operating structure.   
The aim of this transaction was to raise ordinary equity in New Zealand.  The equity 
raising was to be achieved in a way that did not involve the full incorporation of 
Westpac’s New Zealand operations as this would involve considerable regulatory, 
reporting, taxation and accounting complexities (both in New Zealand and Australia).  
The New Zealand shares were issued by the Issuer, a New Zealand company that is an 
existing wholly-owned subsidiary of Westpac Holdings NZ Ltd (“Parent”).  The 
Issuer owns properties used by Westpac in New Zealand, leasing these properties to 
the various Westpac branches and subsidiaries.  It has shares on issue with paid-up 
capital and reserves of approximately $NZ250 million comprising both ordinary and 
redeemable preference shares.  The existing New Zealand-based ordinary 
shareholders in Westpac amount to about 1.2% of the ordinary share capital of 
Westpac, and Issuer raised capital equivalent of up to 5% of the ordinary share capital 
of Westpac. 
The key terms of the NZ shares were as follows: 
 (i) The issue price was related to the price of a Westpac ordinary share on the issue 
date, converted into New Zealand dollars. 
(ii) The payment of dividends was to be at the discretion of the directors of the 
Issuer.  However, if dividends were declared on the NZ Shares, they were to be 
based on the cash dividends of Westpac ordinary shares.  The dividends on the 
NZ Shares will equal dividends paid by Westpac on the Westpac ordinary 
shares multiplied by the exchange fraction, converted into New Zealand dollars 
at the prevailing foreign exchange rates.  If declared, full dividends were to be 
paid on the partly paid shares. 
(iii) The Issuer was to “mirror” all bonus issues, share splits, consolidations and 
rights issues undertaken by Westpac in respect of Westpac ordinary shares.   
(iv) The holders of the New Zealand Shares (“New Zealand Holders”) were to have 
their voting rights in the Issuer restricted.  Voting rights at Issuer shareholder 
meetings were to be limited to: 
? ? decisions concerning major transactions under the New Zealand      
Companies Act, and 
? ? amendments to the Issuer’s constitution to the extent that such 
amendments affect the rights attached to the New Zealand Shares. 
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(v) Rights to receive distributions on liquidation of the Issuer will be on a pro rata 
basis with the Issuer’s ordinary shareholders. 
The offer was made primarily to the New Zealand public.  The offer of NZ Shares 
was not specifically made to the current Westpac ordinary shareholders, nor was there 
any necessity for shareholders in Westpac to give up their shares and acquire shares in 
the Issuer.  There was no stapling of shares.  
The funds raised from the issue were lent by the Issuer to the Borrower, which is a 
New Zealand resident company that is another wholly-owned subsidiary of Westpac 
Holdings NZ Ltd. It was intended to attach imputation credits to the fullest extent 
possible to the dividends paid to the New Zealand Holders.  The imputation credits 
would arise from payments of tax made by the Issuer in respect of its taxable income 
(which would include the interest received on the deposit, the net fund flows (if any) 
arising under the swap and its property related income). 
The purpose of the arrangement was to raise ordinary equity in New Zealand.  
Westpac wished to issue shares to the public in New Zealand as part of Westpac’s 
broader capital management strategy including creating shareholder value and 
diversifying the capital base, and to support Westpac’s regional banking and branding 
strategy.   
These transactions were designed to ensure that the issuer derived sufficient gross 
income and paid enough New Zealand company tax to distribute a fully imputed 
dividend to its New Zealand shareholders which was equal to the equivalent dividend 
paid by the parent company to its Australian shareholders. 
7.4 Key taxation issues to be resolved 
The key taxation issue was whether the payment of dividends constituted an 
imputation streaming arrangement.  The Act contains a number of specific anti-
avoidance provisions which are designed to prevent the streaming of imputation 
credits to those taxpayers who can most effectively utilise them. 
The two key anti-avoidance provisions are: 
? ? streaming of dividends (section GC 22), and 
? ? stapled stock arrangements (section GC 23). 
Since the issuer will pay fully imputed dividends in New Zealand dollars to New 
Zealand individual shareholders both sections could potentially apply to the class of 
shares issued by New Co. 
The ANZ share issue 
7.5 Shortly after Westpac announced details of its capital raising proposal, ANZ 
obtained a similar binding ruling.  However the ANZ proposal has not yet been 
implemented.  The following diagram is based on the information contained in 
product ruling ANZ BR PDR OO/14.11   
 
 
                                               
11 Tax Information Bulletin Vol 13: No 2  (Feb 2001) pp 12-21. 
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(4) dividends
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12See n 11 pp 12-21. 
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7.6 Commercial objectives 
The ANZ Group has its parent company (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Limited (“ANZBG”)) in Australia.  ANZBG has, inter alia, the following 
subsidiaries: 
? ? ANZ Funds Pty Ltd (“ANZ Funds”) which is incorporated in Australia, 
? ? ANZ Holdings (New Zealand) Limited (“ANZ Holdings”) which is 
wholly owned by ANZ Funds and is incorporated in New Zealand, and 
? ? ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited (“ANZNZ”) which is 
wholly owned by ANZ Holdings and is incorporated in New Zealand. 
If the proposed float were to proceed.  Three new entities would be established in 
New Zealand: 
? ? a wholly owned subsidiary of ANZNZ referred to in the binding ruling as 
ANZ Sub I would be incorporated in New Zealand, 
? ? a wholly owned subsidiary of ANZNZ referred to as ANZ Sub II would 
be incorporated in New Zealand, and 
? ? a Unit Trust in which ANZ Sub I would hold all of the ordinary units 
would be established in New Zealand 
These three proposed entities would be set up for regulatory, corporate governance 
(primarily, prudentia l reporting), and marketing reasons.  In relation to the prudential 
reporting purposes, the binding ruling noted that it was a priority that the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”) classified the capital raised in New 
Zealand as Tier One capital.  To achieve this objective it would be necessary for the 
funds to be traced from the issue of the capital in New Zealand through to ANZBG in 
Australia solely through non-operating entities.  This is the reason why two new 
separate companies (i.e. ANZ Sub I and ANZ Sub II) would be incorporated in New 
Zealand.  The binding ruling refers to three other considerations for setting up the new 
entities: 
? ? To achieve transparency for capital raising from both the bank’s and the    
New Zealand Investors’ perspectives. 
? ? From the Investors’ perspective, it was considered preferable that the 
proposed entity in which they would be investing should have a simple 
and predetermined cash flow. 
? ? From the Investors’ and the bank’s perspectives, it was considered 
preferable that the new ANZ entities, rather than the issuing entity, were 
party to the swap and loan because this would allow greater flexibility to 
operate and react to commercial changes in relation to the swap and the 
loan. 
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The binding ruling noted that the ANZ Group wished to raise capital in New Zealand 
for the following four reasons: 
? ? to increase the percentage of New Zealand shareholders, 
? ? to increase the level of retail investors, 
? ? to increase ANZ’s profile in the New Zealand market, and 
? ? to raise Tier 1 capital. 
If the transactions described in the binding ruling were to proceed then the following 
steps would be implemented. 
7.7 The Unit Trust 
If the proposal is implemented a Unit Trust would be established in New Zealand.  
The purpose of the Unit Trust would be to raise capital in New Zealand for the ANZ 
Group through the issue of debentures issued by ANZ Sub I. 
The total cost per unit to investors would be based on the average of the ASX traded 
price of ANZ ordinary shares converted to New Zealand dollars at the NZ$/A$ 
exchange rate.  
The units would have limited voting rights.  The rights would be limited to 
extraordinary resolutions relating to the alteration of rights attached to the units.  
Future distributions (dividends for tax purposes) would be paid on the units to 
coincide with any dividends paid by ANZBG on its ordinary shares.  The amount of 
distribution on each unit would match, in New Zealand dollars, the cash dividend paid 
in Australian dollars by ANZBG on each ordinary share. 
If ANZBG did not pay any dividends on its ordinary shares, there would be no 
distribution to the unit holders.  To the extent that imputation credits would be 
available, they would be attached to the distributions paid to investors.  However, the 
attachment of imputation credits would not be guaranteed, nor would the cash 
distribution be grossed up if it were not fully imputed. 
7.8 Forward sale and purchase agreement 
If the proposal is implemented, then, under the forward sale and purchase agreement, 
the investors would agree to sell and ANZBG would agree to buy the units for an 
agreed amount.  In addition, investors would agree to purchase and ANZBG would 
agree to issue ANZBG shares for the same amount.  These amounts would be offset 
against each other. 
The forward sale and purchase agreement would be entered into on the date that the 
units are issued.  On that date, ANZBG would pay for the units and the investors 
would pay for the shares.  The price paid for the shares and units would be the same 
and would be the issue price of the units.   
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7.9 Loan to ANZ Sub I 
If the proposal is implemented Unit Trust will enter into a variable rate debenture 
agreement with ANZ Sub I whereby the Unit Trust will lend funds invested by 
investors to ANZ Sub I by way of a number of debentures which will be perpetual. 
Interest on the debenture would be paid to coincide with the dividends paid by 
ANZBG on its ordinary shares.  The timing of the payments by ANZ Sub I would be 
triggered by the payment of dividends by ANZBG on its ordinary shares.  At the same 
time as ANZBG pays dividends on its ordinary shares, ANZ Sub II would pay 
amounts under the swap and the loan to ANZ Sub I.  When ANZ Sub I receives these 
amounts it would pay dividends on the ordinary shares to ANZNZ and interest on the 
section FC 1 debentures to the Unit Trust. 
7.10 Loan to ANZ Sub II 
ANZ Sub I would enter into a loan agreement with ANZ Sub II.  The loan would be 
perpetual.  
7.11 Loan to ANZBG NY 
Under the proposal, ANZ Sub II would enter into a variable rate debenture agreement 
with ANZBG NY.  The debenture would be denominated in New Zealand dollars.  
Interest would be payable to coincide with the dividend payable by ANZBG on its 
ordinary shares.  The amount would be determined by a formula which would be 
based on the New Zealand dollar equivalent of the ANZBG cash dividend grossed up 
for withholding tax (if any). 
7.12 Swap 
If the proposal is implemented, an important transaction would be the dividend for 
interest swap.  Under the swap agreement, ANZ Sub I would be obligated to pay ANZ 
Sub II an amount equal to the interest it receives from ANZ Sub II under the loan.  In 
return, ANZ Sub II would be obligated to pay ANZ Sub I an amount equal to the net 
cash dividend received on the ANZBG debenture. 
The payment that ANZ Sub I makes to ANZ Sub II under the swap would be made at 
the time ANZ Sub II makes the interest payment to ANZ Sub I under the loan.  The 
payment that ANZ Sub II makes to ANZ Sub I under the swap would be made at the 
same time ANZBG NY pays a dividend to ANZ Sub II on its debenture. 
The potential application of the anti-avoidance provisions contained in section GC 22 
and section GC 23 of the Act are the main taxation issues which would arise if the 
proposed ANZ float were to proceed.   
8. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE IMPEDIMENTS 
8.1 Anti-credit streaming rules 
The Act contains an extensive array of provisions that are designed to prevent a New 
Zealand resident company from allocating its available imputation credits to the 
shareholders who can best utilise them.  The current prohibitions include: 
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? ? the benchmark allocation rule,13 
? ? the maximum imputation credit rule,14 and 
? ? specific anti-avoidance provisions.15 
There is little doubt that the adoption of the full credit streaming option would breach 
the current provisions and legislative amendments would be necessary.   
8.2 Historical rationale for the existing rules 
The current regime was designed to, inter alia, deter New Zealand resident companies 
from circumventing the CFC and FIF regimes by preventing their New Zealand 
resident shareholders from gaining access to imputation credits. 
Secondly, the bench mark allocation rule is designed to prevent a company paying the 
same cash dividend, but with different imputation credits that reflect the current three 
marginal rates of tax.  
Thirdly, the current regime is also designed to prevent a company from streaming its 
available imputation credits to its resident New Zealand shareholders to the detriment 
of its foreign shareholders, who at the time the regime was set up, were unable to 
utilise New Zealand imputation credits.   
8.3 Full streaming option 
The adoption of the full streaming approach would not breach the current rules 
because the proposal would envisage all resident New Zealand shareholders receiving 
the same imputation credit.  The current rules would protect the tax base. 
However, the introduction of the foreign investor tax credit (FITC) regime has 
circumvented the third of the historical reasons for the anti-streaming rules.  Under 
the FITC regime, foreign shareholders effectively receive their proportionate share of 
the benefit of New Zealand company tax via the supplementary dividend mechanism.  
Clearly the foreign shareholders receive an “imputation credit” which is proportionate 
to the tax that they have in effect borne in New Zealand.   
8.4 Streaming of dividends 
Streaming of dividends involves companies or shareholders seeking to obtain a tax 
advantage either through: 
? ? an arrangement for the sale or disposition of shares (GC 22(1)(a)), or 
? ? streaming credits to those shareholders best able to use them 
(GC 22(1)(b)). 
Unfortunately, neither of the binding rulings explains why the IRD believe these two 
provisions did not apply.  The following analysis is one possible interpretation. 
                                               
13 Section ME 8(2) of the Act. 
14 Section ME 8(1) of the Act. 
15 Sections GC 21, 22 and 23 of the Act. 
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8.5 Section GC 22(1)(a)(iii) 
In order for there to be an arrangement for inter alia the issue of shares, all of the four 
separate criteria contained in section GC 22(1)(a) must be satisfied. 
For the purposes of section GC 22(1)(a) both the Westpac and ANZ structures prima 
facie satisfy the first two requirements: 
? ? All shareholders can reasonably expect a dividend to be paid in respect of 
the New Zealand class of shares. 
? ? The New Zealand issuer can reasonably expect that imputation credits will 
be attached to any dividends paid on the New Zealand class of shares. 
The third criterion is that the shareholder must be a party to an arrangement.16  The 
ANZ and Westpac structures are clearly designed to benefit New Zealand resident 
shareholders, but does that mean those shareholders are automatically “a party”?  If 
they are a party, are they a party to an arrangement?  The term “arrangement” is 
defined in OB1 of the Act as any “contract, agreement, plan or understanding”, 
whether enforceable or not, and all steps by which it is carried into effect. 
It is difficult to see how the mere subscription for shares by a passive investor 
pursuant to a public offer makes that shareholder a party to an agreement.  A passive 
shareholder is not a party to any contract or agreement because they had no right to 
any shares.  Nor are they a party to a plan or understanding because they knew 
nothing about the structure until it was announced in the media. 
The recent decision of the Court of Appeal supports this line of analysis.  In CIR v 
BNZ Investments Ltd.17 Richardson P held that an essential element in the definition 
of an “arrangement” is: 
… a meeting of minds between parties involving an expectation on the 
part of each that the other would act in a particular way …  The essential 
thread is mutuality as to content.  The meeting of minds embodies an 
expectation as to future conduct.  There is consensus as to what is to be 
done. 
In view of the relationship between the New Zealand resident shareholders, the 
underlying commercial objectives, the ownership, and operating structures, it is 
reasonable to assume that the shareholders were never consulted about what 
ultimately transpired.  They were confronted with a “take it or leave it” option to 
invest in a new structure which provided them with an imputation credit.  The 
shareholders may have been aware of the problem, but that level of knowledge does 
not make them a party to the solution, which was put in place without any prior 
shareholder consultation or discussion. 
8.6 Section GC 22(1)(a)(iv) 
Similar considerations arise in relation to paragraph (iv) of section GC 22(1)(a), 
which provides: 
                                               
16 Section GC 22(1)(a)(iii)(A) refers to a person who is a party to an arrangement that attaches an imputation credit to a dividend. 
17 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,103 at page 17,117 paragraph 50. 
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(iv) The purpose, not being an incidental purpose, of the arrangement 
is that a party to the arrangement would obtain any such tax advantage. 
The concept of “purpose” in relation to the general anti-avoidance provisions in the 
Act is discussed in the Commissioner of Inland Revenue’s Policy Statement on the 
interpretation of what is now section BG I of the Act (Tax Information Bulletin Vol.1, 
No. 8, Appendix C). 
The Policy Statement correctly notes the test to be applied in ascertaining the purpose 
or effect of an arrangement is objective.  Regard is had not to the motive of the parties 
but to the effect achieved by their actions.  If there is an income tax advantage then it 
is necessary to identify whether or not that advantage is merely an incidental purpose 
or effect of the arrangement. 
The Policy Statement quoted from the judgement of Woodhouse P in CIR v Challenge 
Corporation Limited (1986):18 
… the phrase ‘merely incidental purpose or effect’ in the context of 
section [BG1] points to something which is necessarily linked and 
without contrivance to some other purpose or effect so that it can be 
regarded as a natural concomitant.  Many taxpayers when considering a 
course of action are likely to appreciate and welcome an opportunity 
provided by the Act for achieving some tax benefit as an aspect of it.  But 
this should not bring the transaction or transactions almost 
automatically within the avoidance provisions of s[BG1].  By itself 
conscious recognition and acceptance that a commercial transaction will 
be accompanied by a degree of tax relief is not the issue. 
 
… when construing s[BG1] and the qualifying implications of the 
reference to ‘incidental purpose’ I think the questions which arise need 
to be framed in terms of the degree of economic reality associated with a 
given transaction in contrast to artificiality or contrivance or what may 
be described as to the extent to which it appears to involve exploitation of 
the statute while in direct pursuit of tax benefits.  To put the matter in 
another way, there is all the difference in the world between the prudent 
attention on one hand that can always be given sensibly and quite 
properly to the tax implications likely to arise from a course of action 
when deciding whether or not to pursue it and its pursuit on the other 
hand simply to achieve a manufactured tax advantage.” 
 
In both cases the primary purpose of the arrangements was to raise additional capital 
in a tax-efficient manner within the meaning of the Woodhouse test.  The purpose is 
not to obtain a tax advantage but rather to increase the funds available for distribution 
to shareholders.  The fact that structuring the operations in this way is likely to result 
in a “tax advantage” via the payment of imputed dividends is clearly incidental to the 
primary purpose.  The Westpac Group and ANZ Banking Group are entitled to raise 
additional equity in a tax-effective manner. 
                                               
18 8 NZTC 5,001 at page 5,006 and 5,007 
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8.7 Section GC 22(1)(b) 
Section GC 22(1) defines the second type of prohibited tax advantage. 
(1) For the purposes of this section, there shall be an arrangement 
to obtain a tax advantage where …   
   
(b)  In respect of any one or more distributions (including bonus 
issues) by a company, whether occurring in the same imputation 
year or over more than one imputation year, the company streams 
the payment of dividends, or the attachment of imputation credits 
or dividend withholding payment credits or both to any dividends, 
in such a way as will give higher credit values to persons who will 
obtain a tax advantage from them than to persons who will not so 
obtain a tax advantage, or who may reasonably be expected to 
derive a lesser benefit from any tax advantage. (Emphasis added). 
 
Under the ANZ and Westpac solutions, fully-imputed dividends will be paid by both 
issuers to all their shareholders.  The question is whether creating “the New Zealand 
class of shares”, and incorporating the method of paying dividends on these classes of 
shares into the issuing entity’s corporate constitutions, amounts to dividend or 
imputation streaming. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the key phrase contemplates a comparison of 
benefits, to ascertain whether one party will receive a higher credit and thus obtain a 
tax advantage that is not received by the other shareholders.  
No party will receive a higher credit and thus obtain a tax advantage.  Both binding 
rulings suggest this provision will not be breached because there will only be one 
class of share issued by the issuer.  Accordingly, there is nothing to compare.  No 
comparison can be made between the impact on different groups of shareholders. 
8.8 Stapled stock arrangements 
Stapled stock arrangements usually involve non-resident companies arranging for 
dividends, with imputation credits attached, to be paid by a New Zealand resident 
company to New Zealand shareholders.  For example, a company resident in Australia 
with New Zealand shareholders, which also owned a New Zealand tax paying 
subsidiary, would arrange for the New Zealand subsidiary to pay dividends to the 
New Zealand shareholders. 
It is possible to enter into an arrangement whereby the non-resident company sets up a 
company in New Zealand and issues shares in the New Zealand company to its New 
Zealand shareholders.  The shares in the New Zealand company are stapled to the 
shares in the non-resident company because they are allocated on the basis of the 
shareholding in the non-resident company.  Often, the stapled New Zealand shares 
may only be disposed of with the parent company shares.  Dividends can then be paid 
from the New Zealand company.  By sourcing the dividends from New Zealand tax 
paid profits, imputation credits can be attached. 
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8.9 Section GC 23 
This provision provides that: 
 
(1) Where, in relation to a company and a shareholder in the company, 
there is an arrangement entered into for the purpose, or for the 
purposes including the purpose, that –  
(a) The shareholder or, where the shareholder is a trustee in 
relation to the share or shares held, any beneficiary of that 
trust, or any person associated with either the shareholder or 
any such beneficiary, may be paid a dividend by another 
company, whether directly or indirectly by any means 
whatever 
(b) The shareholder or, where the shareholder is a trustee in 
relation to the share or shares held, any beneficiary of that 
trust, or any person associated with either the shareholder or 
any such beneficiary, may acquire any shares in another 
company so that the other company may pay a dividend to 
the shareholder or the beneficiary or the associated person, 
whether directly or indirectly by any means whatever.  
Any dividend paid to the shareholder or, as the case may be, the 
beneficiary or associated person by that other company under the 
arrangement shall, for the purposes of the imputation rules, be 
deemed to be a dividend paid by the company. (Emphasis added). 
Section GC 23(1) does not apply to the arrangement described in either binding ruling 
because there is no “arrangement” within the meaning of section GC 23(1).  Section 
GC 23(1) applies where there is an arrangement between the arranging company and a 
shareholder of the arranging company.  In relation to the Westpac and ANZ binding 
rulings, this would require an arrangement to have been entered into between the 
issuer and its New Zealand shareholders.  That will not occur. 
However, under both binding rulings the arrangement is between the Aust Parent Co, 
New Zealand shareholders and the New Zealand issuer.  Although the purpose tests 
set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) bring in an associated person test, this is 
conditional on there being an initial arrangement to which the shareholder is a party.  
In the case of a public issue of shares, the ultimate shareholders are not a party to any 
arrangement. 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that there was an “arrangement”, the result from 
applying the rest of the section does not appear to fit within the mischief identified by 
Parliament.  Who is the other company that the shareholders of the issuer will receive 
a dividend from?  It is not the Aust Parent Co.  Nor are the shares in the issuer 
attached to the shares of the Aust Parent Co.  
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9. EQUITY INSTRUMENTS 
9.1 Introduction 
Prior to the release of the discussion document, a Trans-Tasman company dominated 
by Australian individual shareholders had no incentive to encourage a New Zealand 
operating subsidiary to pay New Zealand company tax.  From the Australian 
shareholder’s perspective, the most tax effective strategy was to maximise the 
payment of Australian company tax at the expense of the New Zealand corporate tax 
base.  The adoption of the pro rata solution will not provide any taxation incentives 
for this type of Trans-Tasman corporate group to modify its Australian tax strategy.  It 
is more likely than not to be a case of business as usual. 
Important subsets of the general tax strategy are techniques to reduce any New 
Zealand NRWT associated with the repatriation by the New Zealand operating 
subsidiary to its Australian parent company of: 
? ? realised capital profits, and 
? ? dividends sourced from profits which did not generate suficient 
imputation credits to pay a fully imputed dividend. This would be the case 
if the operating subsidiary had access to tax losses, or entered into 
transactions which reduced its taxable income.  
How then can the New Zealand operating subsidiary transfer to its Aust Parent Co 
“tax free” funds generated in New Zealand without triggering a liability to NRWT?  
The payment of a conventional dividend is not an option because it would be prima 
facie subject to NRWT at the reduced treaty rate with no supplementary 
dividend/FITC credit to fund the 15% NRWT. 
9.2 Interest-free loans 
A simple, commercial way for the New Zealand operating subsidiary to repatriate 
surplus tax free cash would be to make an interest-free loan to its Aust Parent Co.  
Those funds could be used in Australia to generate additional Australian taxable 
income and franking credits.  The New Zealand corporate tax base suffers an 
opportunity cost because under the current law and the pro rata allocation model there 
would often be insufficient tax incentives for the Trans-Tasman group to use the 
available funds to generate imputation credits. 
However, this strategy would immediately create an exposure to New Zealand 
NRWT.  Section CF 2(2)(e) of the Act provides that an interest-free loan made by a 
company to a shareholder creates a deemed dividend.  Section CF 2(1)(k) of the Act 
would catch any attempt by the New Zealand operating subsidiary to loan the tax-free 
funds to another member of the Australian group, that is, to an entity which is 
associated with the Aust Parent Co.  Sections CF 2(11) and (12) of the Act deal with 
the quantification and derivation of any deemed dividend arising from the operation 
of section CF 2(1)(e) of the Act.  Briefly, the deemed dividend is calculated having 
regard to the prevailing market interest rates applicable to that type of company. 
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9.3 Debentures 
The taxation risks associated with an interest-free loan sourced from “tax free” funds 
could prior to 1 July 2002 be overcome by the Trans-Tasman group putting in place a 
hybrid instrument.  The tax features were designed to: 
? ? create additional franking credits, 
? ? minimise New Zealand NRWT, 
? ? minimise Australian NRWT, and  
? ? create a net tax advantage for the Trans-Tasman group arising from the 
divergent tax treatment of the hybrid. 
One type of instrument which achieved the four tax objectives was an FC 1 debenture.  
Section FC 1 was originally inserted into the Act to deal with a domestic problem.  At 
the time it was enacted, the CFC, FIF, FDWP and imputation regimes did not exist.  
The current Trans-Tasman tax dilemma was beyond the contemplation of the 
legislature.  The Government of the day cannot be criticised for enacting a provision 
which has created an opportunity for a Trans-Tasman group to repatriate tax-free 
funds without incurring NRWT. 
The following structure was designed to eliminate the potential New Zealand income 
tax exposure and to maximise the payment of Australian corporate tax. 
9.4 The Structure 
Aust Parent Co owned Australian Finance Company (Aust Fin Co) and NZ Holdings 
Co. New Zealand Operating Company (NZ Op Co) and NZ Fin Co are owned by NZ 
Holdings Co. 
The following diagram summarises the key parties and the sequence of transactions: 
? ? NZ Operating Co loaned surplus funds to a sister company NZ Fin Co. 
? ? NZ Fin Co loaned the surplus funds via a floating rate debenture (FRD) to 
a special purpose finance company that was a member of the Australian 
group, Aust Fin Co. 
? ? Aust Fin Co then lent the funds at interest to its present parent company to 
retire existing third party debt. 
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Diagram 4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B. All subsidiaries in this table represent 100% ownership 
 
 
 
  
 
 
9.5   Summary of interest and dividend flows 
The annual interest and dividend flows were as follows: 
? ? Aust Fin Co paid interest to NZ Fin Co and claim a corresponding tax 
deduction.  Interest withholding tax (NRWT) in Australia must be 
deducted at the rate of 10% of the gross interest. 
? ? For New Zealand tax purposes the Floating Rate Debenture (FRD) was 
classified as a share.  All interest paid on the FRD was reclassified as a 
dividend.  The dividend received by NZ Fin Co was treated as exempt 
income for income tax purposes. 
? ? NZ Fin Co was required to deduct foreign dividend withholding payment 
(FDWP).  The amount is 33% of the gross interest paid by the Australian 
finance company less the NRWT paid in Australia.  
? ? NZ Fin Co then paid interest or a dividend to NZ Op Co or NZ Holding 
Co.    
 Australian individual 
shareholders  
Bank Aust Parent 
Co 
Aust Fin Co 
NZ Holding Co 
NZ Operating Co NZ Fin Co 
 1-4 Initial flow of Funds 
 5-9 Periodic flow of Funds 
1. Loan 
2.  FRD
6. Interest/ 
Dividend 
8. Dividend 
9. Dividend 
5. Interest
4. Repay debt 3. Loan 
7. Dividend 
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? ? NZ Holding Co paid a dividend to Aust Parent Co.  The dividend was 
equal to the net of tax interest received.  NZ Holding Co could offset the 
FDWP payment against the NRWT liability on the dividend.  The excess 
FDWP would then be reclaimed by the Aust Parent Co. 
? ? NZ Holding could also add imputation credits to the dividend.  The 
amount of credits equalled the NRWT deducted in Australia. 
? ? Aust Parent Co could then reinvest the periodic dividend into the 
Australian group of companies. 
 
The following table summarises the tax consequences based on a $100m FRD at 10% 
interest. 
 
Table 9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.6    Comparative advantages of floating rate debenture loan 
For the reasons summarised above, if funds that had been sourced from a realised 
capital gain were lent by a member of the New Zealand group to the Australian group, 
this would trigger a non-cash dividend equal to the difference between the market rate 
of interest that should be paid on the loan and the actual interest, if any, paid by the 
Australian group. 
That dividend would be subject to a non-utilisable New Zealand NRWT cost of 15% 
of the deemed dividend, unless imputation credits were used to fully impute the 
FRD 10% 
Principal sum  100.00m 
Australian interest @ 10%               (10.00m) 
A  Gross Australian tax saving @ 30% 3.00m 
     After tax cost 7.00m 
 
B  Australian NRWT @ 10%  (1.00m) 
     NZ Gross interest/dividend 10.00m 
C  NZ net FDWP (less NRWT) (2.30m) 
D  NZ net tax on interest (less NRWT)                  Nil 
     NZ cash available for dividend  6.70m 
     NZ cash, plus FDWP credit for NRWT purposes  9.00m 
     NZ NRWT @ 15% on 9.00m  (1.35m) 
     Less NZ FDWP credit   (2.30m)   
E  Refund of excess FDWP  0.950m 
 
Cash dividend to Aust Parent Co 7.650m 
Tax (Cost) benefit to group 0.650m 
(A-B-C-D+E) 
 
3.0 m – 1.0 m – 2.3 m – 0 + 0.950 m = 0.650m 
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deemed dividend.  Under New Zealand’s accrual regime, a tax exposure would also 
arise from foreign exchange fluctuations on the principal amount of the $A loan. 
If the initial available tax -free cash were remitted to Australia via a Floating Rate 
Debenture (FRD), there would be no adverse New Zealand or Australian corporate 
income tax consequences.  From a New Zealand perspective, the New Zealand 
operating subsidy is deemed to have acquired equity in a “Grey List” country.  The 
Australian entity was treated as having borrowed a sum of money which, prior to the 
introduction of the new debt/equity rules, did not, everything else being equal,19 create 
any insurmountable Australian tax problems.  The above table shows the overall tax 
saving to the Australian group associated with the annual cash flow that was used to 
overcome any potential New Zealand NRWT created by New Zealand deemed 
dividend rules.  It is important to note that the net tax cost was borne by the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO). 
This technique involves setting in place a debt instrument that constitutes an FRD in 
terms of section FC1 of the Act. 
For New Zealand purposes, the Act re-characterised the instrument as equity.  For 
Australian purposes, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (the 1936 Act) treated the 
instrument as debt.  The impact of the new Australian debt equity rules which came 
into effect on 1 July 2002 have not been taken into account. This example is designed 
to illustrate how Trans-Tasman companies have successfully exploited the 
asymmetrical tax treatment to develop ad hoc solutions.  FRD may no longer be a tax 
effective technique. However, under the grand-fathering provisions existing, FC 1 
debenture structures will not be adversely affected until 1st July 2004.    
9.7 Commercial characteristics of a section FC1 FRD 
For New Zealand tax purposes, an FRD is a loan where the interest payable is not set 
at a fixed rate.  Instead the interest is calculated by reference to either: 
? ? the dividend payable by the company which borrowed the funds, or 
? ? the company’s profits, however measured. 
It is essential that the interest payable should be calculated by reference to the 
company’s profits.  For this reason it would be useful for a special purpose Australian 
company to be set up to act as the designated borrower.  That would enable the Aust 
Parent Co and NZ Fin Co to control the annual interest/dividend flows thereby 
ensuring the instrument satisfied the requirements of section FC I of the Act.  
Secondly, the payment of interest under the FRD would allow Aust Fin Co to claim 
an interest deduction in Australia.  Any tax loss created by that payment would be 
grouped against the Aust Parent Co’s other income. 
9.8 Taxation Features of the Section FC 1 FRD 
A debenture that satisfied section FC 1 is expressly defined as a “share” for the 
purposes of the New Zealand Act.  For Australian purposes, it was treated as “loan” 
capital.  No deemed dividend implications arose from the fact that the interest on the 
                                               
19 The only issue to consider was the Australian thin capitalisation rules.  This was unlikely to be an issue if the tax-free funds 
were used to retire an equivalent amount of existing debt. 
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debenture may have been less than the market value since the debenture issued by 
Aust Fin Co was treated as a share, not a debt. 
The debenture would be issued in Australian dollars.  Shares and section FC 1 FRDs 
are excluded from New Zealand’s accrual regime, therefore no adverse New Zealand 
foreign exchange tax consequences arise from fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
When the debenture matured and the loan was repaid the repayment proceeds would 
be treated as a return of “share capital” for New Zealand tax purposes.  This is 
important because a FRD comes within the definition of a “non-participating 
redeemable share” and is therefore excluded from the dividend rules. 
Finally, foreign exchange gains and losses associated with the redemption of an 
Australian denominated “share” are ignored under the return of capital rules,  
therefore no adverse tax consequences arise from repayment of the loan principal. 
9.9 Taxation features of interest paid under a FRD 
Subject to the potential application of the Australian debt creation rules, interest paid 
on the FRD would have been deductible to Aust Fin Co, and could have provided a 
30% gross tax benefit in Australia.  The interest did suffer a 10% Australian non-
resident withholding tax payment. 
The interest receipt was treated as a “dividend” when received by NZ Fin Co.  The 
foreign dividend received by NZ Fin Co was exempt from New Zealand income tax 
under section CB 10(1).  NZ Fin Co was required to deduct FDWP under section NH 
1 of the Act. 
The FDWP liability was calculated at 33% of the gross dividend, less the amount of 
Australian withholding tax deducted from the interest payment.  FDWP is a liability 
of NZ Fin Co and should be paid to the IRD during the quarter in which the 
“dividend” is received. 
Underlying foreign tax credits are not available to reduce the FDWP liability because 
the dividend created a deduction for Australian income tax purposes.  See section 
LF 2(2) of the Act. 
9.10 Payment of interest by NZ Holding Co 
When the funds were received by NZ Holding Co it had to pay a dividend to Aust 
Parent Co in order to obtain a refund of the surplus FDWP.  When the dividend was 
on-paid by NZ Holding Co, it could have attached to it the FDWP credit and an 
imputation credit.  The FDWP credit was refundable in cash to Aust Parent Co after 
offsetting the New Zealand NRWT liability of 15% on the gross dividend (including 
the supplementary dividend). 
The cash dividend was only credited (with FDWP credits) to the extent of 
approximately $23.00 on a cash dividend of $67.  This leaves an unimputed portion 
which was subject to NRWT unless surplus imputation credits were attached.  
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10. CONDUIT TAX RELIEF 
10.1 Introduction 
In relation to the periodic cash flows that are made to avoid any potential deemed 
dividends, the New Zealand group of companies can be completely relieved from its 
FDWP liability by taking advantage of the conduit tax regime.  A conduit tax relief 
company that receives a dividend subject to FDWP may be partially or completely 
relieved of the obligation to deduct FDWP by section NH 7 of the Act.  The extent of 
the tax relief is dependent on the percentage of the company’s shareholders who are 
not resident in New Zealand.  In the table below, the Australian shareholding is 
assumed to be 100%. 
10.2 An example 
The main advantage of using conduit tax relief (CTR) is that it can eliminate the 
payment of any New Zealand tax.  This would reduce the total tax leakage to 
Australian NRWT of 10% ($1m), thereby enhancing the net tax saving available to 
the Australian shareholders. 
 
Table 10  
 Conduit Relief FDWP 
(a) CFC Income Nil Nil 
 
(b) FDWP Relief  NH 7 
Net Cash 9.0 9.0 
Add Aust NRWT 1.0 1.0 
Gross Dividend 10.0 10.0 
 FDWP 33%   3.3 3.3 
Less Aust NRWT (1.0) (1.0) 
Less UFTC Nil Nil 
FDWP 2.3 2.3  
Less UH7(1) CTR (2.3) Nil 
Net FDWP Nil 2.3 
Net Cash 9.0 6.7 
 
(c) Dividend Paid Aust Parent Co 100% 
Cash 9.0 6.7 
FDWP Credits Nil 2.3 
LG1 CTR Dividend 2.3      Nil  
Gross Dividend 11.3 9.0 
NRWT 15% Nil* Nil* 
Add Excess FDWP Credits  (0.95m) 
Net Cash Aust Parent Co 9.00m 7.65m 
 
*Sufficient imputation credits would be attached to the gross dividend to eliminate the 
amount of NRWT which would otherwise have been payable. 
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11. BONUS ISSUES AND NRWT 
11.1 An unresolved problem 
One issue which is unlikely to be solved by either the pro rata allocation solution or 
the streaming model is the tax effective repatriation of New Zealand-sourced, realised 
capital profits to Australia.  The fundamental problem is that a realised capital profit 
by definition does not involve the payment of any New Zealand company tax, and 
consequently there are no imputation credits arising from the transaction.  Any 
dividend which is sourced from the realised capital profit is, prima facie, subject to 
NRWT. 
11.2 A hypothetical example 
Consider the case of an Australian Parent Company (Aust Parent Co) which owns a 
New Zealand subsidiary, which owns a capital asset that has been realised, thereby 
creating a tax-free capital gain in the hands of the New Zealand subsidiary.  The 
Australian parent wishes to distribute the New Zealand sourced gain to its Australian 
shareholders. 
Assume the New Zealand subsidiary owns no other assets.  If the New Zealand 
subsidiary were to repatriate the realised capital profit, NRWT would be payable on 
the grounds that the New Zealand subsidiary does not have sufficient imputation 
credits to fully impute the proposed dividend. 
The tax objective would be to remit the realised capital profit to the Australian 
shareholders in a manner that: 
? ? minimises the exposure to New Zealand NRWT, and 
? ? reduces the overall level of tax to the top Australian marginal rate, which 
is currently 48%. 
11.3 A possible solution 
Prior to 1 July 2002, FC 1 debentures were one possible mechanism to provide a 
solution.  A second method of re-characterising the profit was based on the distinction 
between a taxable and a non-taxable bonus issue.  Briefly, this methodology involved 
the conversion of the available cash “dividend” into a non-taxable bonus issue, and 
the sale of the non-taxable bonus shares to a related party. The key steps were as 
follows: 
1. Aust Parent Co owned a NZ Subsidiary (NZ Sub).  Aust Parent Co would 
incorporate a new New Zealand subsidiary, New Co 1. 
2. New Co 1 would borrow $100 from an Australian bank and obtain AIL status. 
3. The $100 would be used by New Co 1 to subscribe for shares in a subsidiary 
called New Co 2, which would be a New Zealand resident.  This step is 
designed to achieve an interest deduction in New Zealand. 
4. NZ Sub would declare a non-taxable bonus issue to its Aust Parent Co. 
5. Aust Parent Co would sell the NZ SUB to New Co 2, including the NTBI. 
6. New Co 2 would pay the Aust Parent Co $100 for the NZ Sub. 
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7. Aust Parent Co would deposit the proceeds from the sale of the NTBI with the 
Australian Bank, which would have lent the money to New Co 1. 
8. NZ Sub would pay a cash dividend of $100 to New Co 2, which would be 
sourced from the realised capital profit. 
9. New Co 2 in turn would pass the $100 dividend to New Co 1. 
10. New Co 1 would use the cash dividend to repay principal and interest to the 
Australian Bank. 
11. The Australian  Bank would repay the $100 loan from the Aust Parent Co. 
 
11.4 Diagrammatic Summary 
 
The following diagrams illustrate this sequence of events. 
 
 
Diagram 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steps 1 - 4 
Aust Parent Co Australian Bank 
NZ Sub New Co 2 New Co 1 
Realised Capital Profit $100 
3.  Pay for shares $100, via 
loan 
2. Loan $100 
Steps 5 - 7 
Australian Parent Australian 
Bank 
NZ Sub New Co 2 New Co 1 
$100 
1. Form 100% subsidiary 
4.  Declare 
$100 NTBI 
7.  Loan $100 
100% owned 
5. Aust Parent Co. must   
sell NZ Sub 
6.  Pay $100 
for NZ sub 
($100) 
 
Issue shares 
                      Transactions 
                     Money passing (2,3) 
 
                      Transactions 
                     Money passing (6,7) 
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Steps 8-11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.5 Anti-avoidance issues 
The main issue is whether the IRD could apply section BG 1 of the Act and its 
associated definitions of “tax avoidance” and “tax avoidance arrangement.”  The 
successful application of the general anti-avoidance provision will ultimately depend 
on how the court interprets the discussion in Challenge Corporation (and subsequent 
cases) and whether it accepts that the use of a non-taxable bonus issue (NTBI) is 
consistent with the scheme and purpose of the Act.  Has the taxpayer company merely 
exercised a structural choice and therefore section BG 1 should not apply so as to 
deprive the taxpayer of that opportunity?   
The Act clearly distinguishes between a NTBI and a taxable bonus issue.  This is clear 
from section CF 2(1)(f) of the Act, which provides that a taxable bonus issue is a 
 
Aust Parent Co 
Australian 
Bank 
NZ Sub New Co 1 New Co 2 
10.  
Repaying 
loan/ 
interest 
$100 (from 
step 2) 
11. Repay loan 
     (as in step 7) 
100% owned 
8. Dividend 9. Dividend 
100% owned  
Summary of transactions between companies 
 
NZ Sub: 
Cash out from: pay ($100) cash dividend [out of Realised 
Capital profit $100 – as in diagram for steps 1-4] 
 
New Co 1: 
Cash in from: Dividend received from NZ Sub $100 
Cash out from: Dividend paid to New Co 2 ($100) 
 
New Co 2: 
Cash in from: Dividend received from New Co 1 $100 
Cash out from: Repayment of loan to Australian Bank ($100) 
 
                     Money passing (8,9,10,11) 
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dividend for tax purposes. Furthermore, the company may attach imputation credits to 
that dividend in accordance with subpart ME of the Act.  If the company elects to 
declare a taxable bonus issue and does not attach imputation credits, then resident 
withholding tax must be paid by the company. 
An NTBI is specifically excluded by section CF 3(1)(a) of the Act from the definition 
of a dividend.  Note, however, that an NTBI does not result in an increase of a 
company’s available subscribed capital.  If the company were to undertake a share 
repurchase or if the company were wound up then the NTBI could not be distributed 
to the shareholders as a tax free dividend.  
Given the clear tax distinction between the two types of bonus issues, it is arguable 
that a company that simply chooses to declare one form of bonus issue as opposed to 
another, is simply exercising a structural choice contained in the Act.  The company 
does not frustrate the scheme and purpose of the Act by simply electing to make the 
most tax-effective form of distribution. 
An example of this principle was the declaration of a taxable bonus issue (with a full 
imputation credit attached) in 1998 by Trustbank prior to the successful take-over by 
Westpac.  The clear tax objective of that strategy was to utilise the available 
imputation credits that would have been lost after the take-over. 
11.6 Recent cases 
This type of structural choice was recognised by the IRD in the 1991 policy statement 
on BG 1.  The policy statement contains numerous references to the scheme and 
purpose analysis put forward by Richardson J in Challenge Corporation and contains 
a number of helpful examples which illustrate the circumstances in which section 
BG 1 should or should not apply.  The closest analogy is the IRD discussion of a 
taxpayer who deliberately uses the valuation options contained in the trading stock 
regime to manipulate the amount of tax which otherwise would have been payable.  
The example involves a change in the rate of company tax from 48% to 28% followed 
by an increase from 28% to 33%.  By changing the valuation method, a taxpayer can 
clearly influence the level of assessable income and can consequently advance the 
derivation of income into the 28% income year and defer the derivation of income 
when the corporate rate of tax switches to 33%.  The IRD state in their policy 
statement that a taxpayer who deliberately sets out to achieve this objective is not 
subject to section BG 1 on the grounds that they have merely exercised a structural 
choice contained in the Act. 
It is arguable that a taxpayer who simply elects one form of bonus issue over another 
is doing no more than a taxpayer exercising their right to change the method of 
trading stock valuation. 
Recent support for this approach can be found in the judgement of the Privy Council 
in O’Neil v CIR.20 Lord Hoffman. in the course of delivering the Board’s advice on a 
“contrived deduction/loss utilisation” scheme. made the following important 
observation.  The potential application of section BG 1 must take into account the 
numerous structural choices contained in the Act: 
                                               
20 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,055. 
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10. It may be more fruitful to concentrate on the nature of the 
concepts by reference to which tax has been imposed.  In many cases 
(though by no means all cases) the legislation will use terms such as 
income, loss and gain, which refer to concepts existing in a world of 
commercial reality, not constrained by precise legal analysis.  A 
composite transaction like the Russell scheme, which may appear not to 
create any tax liability if it is analysed with due regard to the juristic 
autonomy of each of its parts, can be viewed in commercial terms as a 
unitary arrangement to enable the company’s net profits to be shared 
between the shareholders and Mr Russell (Compare MacNiven v 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd [2001] 2 WLR 377.)  Their Lordships 
consider this to be a paradigm of the kind of arrangement which [s BG 
1] was intended to counteract.  On the other hand, the adoption of a 
course of action which avoids tax should not fall within [s BG 1] if the 
legislation, upon its true construction was intended to give the taxpayer 
the choice of avoiding it in that way.  (Emphasis added) 
 
11.7 Consequences 
At the beginning of the exercise, NZ Sub had available $100 of retained earnings 
which have been repatriated to Aust Parent Co in a tax free form.  Aust Parent Co can 
utilise the $100 to invest in Australian assets, thereby increasing the amount of tax 
payable which in turn will create additional franking credits for its shareholders. 
 
12. PLAYING GAMES 
12.1 Introduction 
If the Aust Parent Co distributed all of the New Zealand-sourced after-tax net profit to 
its resident Australian individual shareholders, the total tax cost is 65%.  This 
compares unfavourably with the Aust Parent Co distributing its after tax Australian 
sourced net profit to its shareholders where the total tax cost would only be 48%. 
It is therefore not surprising that the current Trans-Tasman tax system provides a 
strong incentive for the Aust Parent Co to minimise the cost to their individual 
Australian shareholders.  One simple and obvious method is to switch the payment of 
New Zealand company tax from the New Zealand subsidiary to the Aust Parent Co. 
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Table 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.2 Impact of profit repatriation strategies 
It would be a relatively low-cost exercise for an Aust Parent Co to enter into a 
transaction with its New Zealand subsidiary, creating an allowable deduction for the 
subsidiary and assessable income in the hands of the Aust Parent Co.  The above table 
demonstrates the potential tax saving with this technique.  Note that the tax cost 
would be borne by the New Zealand revenue base. 
The benefits to Australian individual shareholders would be significant.  Based on the 
current Trans-Tasman taxation rules a 49% increase in the after tax rate of return to 
Australian individual shareholders could be achieved by this simple technique (i.e. an 
increase in available cash from $35 to $52). 
12.3 Computer software 
A relatively simple and tax effective method of shifting the payment of tax from the 
New Zealand subsidiary to its Aust Parent Co would involve the Aust Parent Co 
selling an accounting package to its New Zealand subsidiary.  The terms of the 
agreement would provide that the New Zealand subsidiary could not duplicate the 
software for external distribution, and that copyright in the software should remain the 
property of the Aust Parent Co. 
The only New Zealand potential tax impost is the imposition of NRWT on the 
grounds that the transaction constitutes a royalty for the purposes of section OE 
 Before After 
 
NZ Subsidiary Company % % 
Gross Income 100 100 
Allowable Deductions Nil (100) 
Tax Payable  33 Nil 
 
 
Australian Company %  % 
Gross Income 67 100 
Tax @ 30%  Nil (30) 
Cash Dividend Paid 67   70 
 
 
Australian Shareholder % % 
Cash Dividend 67 70 
Franking Credit Nil 30 
Tax @ 48% 32 48 
Less Franking Credit  Nil (30) 
Additional Tax Payable  (32) 18 
 
After Tax Available Cash  35 52 
 
Effective Tax Rate 65 48 
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4(1)(r) of the Act.  If the hypothetical transaction were a royalty for New Zealand tax 
purposes, then the New Zealand subsidiary would be required to deduct 10% of the 
gross payment which would reduce the franking credits. 
12.4 Previous IRD rulings 
Prior to the release of Draft Interpretation Guideline IG007 (Draft Guidelines) the 
IRD policy was outlined in Public Information Bulletin 168, issued in January 1988.  
In that document, the IRD stated that all payments for computer software satisfied the 
definition of a royalty irrespective of the specific terms and conditions of the contract.  
That statement was inconsistent with the approach taken by the Australian Tax Office 
(ATO), and statements issued by the OECD. 
In July 1998, the IRD announced that it was withdrawing PIB 168.  Shortly thereafter 
the IRD released the Draft Guidelines and in September 2002 a revised draft was 
issued.  However, the Draft Guidelines must have been amended, as they are 
consistent with the policy adopted by the ATO and the OECD. 
12.5 Draft interpretation guideline IG007 (September 2002) 
The Draft Guidelines correctly note that the New Zealand income tax consequences of 
the transaction, introduced at section 12.3 above, depend on the nature of the 
agreement between the Aust Parent Co and its New Zealand subsidiary.  The 
possibilities are as follows: 
? ? A sale by the Aust Parent Co of its copyright in the software programme to 
the New Zealand subsidiary. 
? ? A licensing of the copyright in the software by the Aust Parent Co to its 
New Zealand subsidiary. 
? ? A sale of a copy of the software programme to the New Zealand 
subsidiary.  
? ? A lease of the software programme to the New Zealand subsidiary. 
? ? The provision of services relating to the Aust Parent Co’s know-how 
which involve a modification of the software programme. 
? ? The supply of know-how by the Aust Parent Co relating to software 
provided to the New Zealand subsidiary. 
12.6 A Trans-Tasman example 
In relation to an outright sale of the copyright to the New Zealand subsidiary, the IRD 
accept that the transaction is not a royalty on the grounds that the contract does not 
provide for the “use of the rights” in the copyright.  This conclusion is consistent with 
the decision of the High Court in DB Group Ltd v CIR.21  Accordingly, the transaction 
is not a royalty and there is no New Zealand tax payable.  However, there are 
commercial reasons why the Aust Parent Co is unlikely to sell its copyright in the 
computer programme to the New Zealand subsidiary. 
                                               
21 (1996) 17 NZTC 12,446. 
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A second possibility would involve the Aust Parent Co granting to the New Zealand 
subsidiary a licence to use its copyright, thereby permitting the New Zealand 
subsidiary to modify the source code.  This transaction would constitute a royalty for 
New Zealand tax purposes, and having regard to the commercial relationship between 
the parties, is unlikely to occur in practice. 
The third possibility is a sale of the copyrighted article to the New Zealand subsidiary.  
The IRD accept that this transaction is analogous to the sale of any other item such as 
a textbook or a video which is subject to copyright.  The New Zealand subsidiary does 
not acquire any copyright.  The most common examples are pre-packaged or “shrink 
wrapped” software.  Under this type of contract, the licence is not for the use of the 
copyright and therefore the transaction does not fall within the definition of a royalty.   
The fourth possibility is a lease of the copyrighted programme.  This transaction is 
unlikely to occur in practice because it could expose the Aust Parent Co to a New 
Zealand NRWT liability.  The transaction could constitute a royalty or, alternatively, 
it may constitute a “finance lease” which could create an exposure to NRWT on the 
deemed interest component of the lease rentals.  The final two possibilities (i.e. the 
supply of services and/or the supply of know-how) will be considered in the next 
paragraph. 
Given the commercial relationship between the parties, the most suitable arrangement 
would be to structure the contract as the sale of an article that is subject to copyright.  
The copyright would remain with the Aust Parent Co, and the New Zealand 
subsidiary would obtain the right to use, for its own internal business purposes, the 
computer programme.  The New Zealand subsidiary does not obtain a “production” 
licence and therefore the transaction is not a royalty as defined in section OB1 of the 
Act.  There are no adverse New Zealand NRWT implications. 
12.7 The provision of labour 
It is more likely than not that the initial computer programme provided by Aust Parent 
Co to its New Zealand subsidiary would require some form of modification or 
enhancement during its life.  Assume that the upgrade work would be carried out by 
the employees of Aust Parent Co.  For the purposes of illustrating an important tax 
planning point, assume that the modification of the initial software package would 
involve up to 12 of the Aust Parent Co’s employees working in New Zealand for no 
more than 6 months.  In view of the extensive amount of work required, Aust Parent 
Co and its New Zealand subsidiary would enter into a separate contract whereby the 
Aust Parent Co provides its employees to the New Zealand subsidiary in exchange for 
a secondment fee.  This fee would constitute an allowable deduction to the New 
Zealand subsidiary.  
Clearly the payment by the New Zealand subsidiary to its Aust Parent Co would 
constitute business income and would have a New Zealand source within the meaning 
of section OE4(1)(a) (income derived from any business carried on in New Zealand) 
or alternatively under section OE4(1)(q) (income derived from any contract partly 
performed in New Zealand). 
However, Aust Parent Co would obtain Treaty protection because Article 5(3) 
provides that the presence of the employees would only constitute a permanent 
establishment if the installation of the software lasts for more than six months, which 
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will not occur in the hypothetical example.  However, Article 5(2) of the definition of 
a permanent establishment refers to, inter alia a branch, an office, and a place of 
management.  Will the presence of Aust Parent Co’s employees in New Zealand for 
less than 6 months fall within that provision? 
12.8 Wise v CIR (1992) 14 NZTC 9,032 
This decision provides a useful insight into how Aust Parent Co and its New Zealand 
subsidiary should structure the contract of secondment.  Provided the principles 
established in Wise are followed, it is highly unlikely that the physical presence of the 
employees for less than six months would create a permanent establishment (PE). 
This case concerned the interpretation of Article 15(2) of the Double Taxation Relief 
(USA) Order 1983.  That Article provided that the remuneration of a resident of the 
US was only subject to tax in New Zealand if, inter alia, the remuneration was borne 
by a permanent establishment, or a fixed base which the employer established in New 
Zealand.  The taxpayer, Wise, was a resident of the US.  He was employed by a 
company incorporated in the US and known as “SSI”.  That company successfully 
tendered for the provision of diving services for a major offshore oil platform located 
in New Zealand.  SSI incorporated a wholly-owned subsidiary in New Zealand which 
was referred to as SSINZ.  The New Zealand subsidiary was required to perform the 
diving contract.  To enable this subsidiary to carry out the contract, SSI made its 
employees available to it.  Wise was an employee of SSI.  He remained on the payroll 
of SSI throughout the duration of the contract.22  The IRD argued that the relief 
provided by Article 15(2) was not available on the grounds that the remuneration paid 
to Wise was borne by a permanent establishment of his employer, namely the New 
Zealand subsidiary, SSINZ.  
The High Court rejected this argument.23  It noted that SSI did not have any branch, 
workshop, factory or any other premises in New Zealand.24  SSI had no nameplate, 
telephone, facsimile or any other connections in New Zealand.  The Court held that 
the evidence went no further than establishing that employees of SSI worked in New 
Zealand. 
The objector’s main argument is that SSI does not carry on any activities 
in New Zealand.  What it does, it does in the US.  Everything else of 
relevance is done in New Zealand by SSINZ.  SSI, it was argued, makes 
staff available to others for the operations of those others, but it is not 
carrying on business wherever its employees happen to be working.25 
This argument was accepted by the High Court, which held that SSI did not have a 
permanent establishment or fixed base in New Zealand: 
The work of direction and control of the repairs, service and 
maintenance of the rig may have been carried out by SSI’s employees, ie 
people on the United States payroll, but there is nothing in the evidence 
                                               
22 The costs of Wise’s remuneration package plus the costs of travel were charged by SSI to SSINZ. 
23 The IRD did not appeal the judgement. 
24 The terms of the contract between SSI and SSINZ were such that SSI could perform all of its contractual obligations without 
having to maintain, equip, staff or operate any offices or base of operations in New Zealand.  
25 (1992) 14 NZTC 9,032 at page 9,039. 
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to suggest that they were answerable to or under the control of SSI for 
the manner in which they did particular work, so that the suggestion that 
their acts were in a vicarious sense the acts of SSI has nothing to support 
it.  The contractual relationship as to what work was to be done existed 
between SSINZ, not SSI, and the Maui field operators or their 
contractors.  The requisitioning of necessary staff was done by SSINZ 
and in the first instance, at least, it would be to SSINZ that the field 
operators would look in the case of faulty work. 26 
12.9 Conclusion 
These two simple hypothetical examples illustrate the likely consequences which 
would continue to occur if the pro rata allocation model becomes the official solution.  
It would not discourage Australasian companies from engaging in profit repatriation 
techniques to the detriment of the New Zealand tax base. 
 
13. DEBT SOLUTIONS 
13.1 Introduction 
In view of the inherent tax inefficiency of the pro rata solution, its introduction is 
unlikely to see a reduction in debt-driven profit repatriation strategies. 
There are two ways for the Aust Parent Co to fund the New Zealand Subsidiary in a 
tax-efficient manner, and create assessable income and franking credits in Australia. 
The first is for the Aust Parent Co to enter into a back-to-back agreement with an 
Australian bank.  The second is for the loan documentation to separate out the New 
Zealand Subsidiary’s obligation to repay the principal sum lent from the interest 
coupons. 
In both of these scenarios, the underlying assumption is that the magnitude of the 
interest payments means that the payment of Approved Issuer Levy (AIL) is greater 
than the transaction cost of inserting an Australian bank into the structure. 
13.2 Back-to-back funding: AIL 
This is by far the most common method.  Aust Parent Co lends the required funds to 
the Australian bank which are used as security for the Australian bank agreeing to 
lend a similar amount to the New Zealand subsidiary.  Any default by the New 
Zealand Subsidiary will allow the Australian bank to access the “secured deposit” 
made by the Aust Parent Co. 
The following diagram illustrates the relationship between the three parties and the 
respective cash flows.  Note that the after-tax cost of the AIL option is 1.34%, and the 
underlying assumption is that the net margin charged by the Australian bank is less 
than this amount. 
                                               
26 (1992) 12 NZTC 9,032 at page 9,041. 
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Diagram 6 
Aust Parent Co
Aust Bank
NZ Subsidiary
1. Deposit
2. Loan
3. Interest
4. Margin
< 1.34%
5. Interest
 
13.3 Key points and issues 
The AIL regime was introduced in the 1991 Budget and it is designed to reduce the 
amount of NRWT which would otherwise have been payable.  To qualify for the AIL 
regime, the New Zealand subsidiary must obtain “approved issuer” status from the 
IRD.  This is governed by section NG 6 of the Act.  After the New Zealand subsidiary 
obtains approval, it can then register the loan from the Australian bank (Aust Bank).   
The role of the Aust Bank is designed to satisfy the statutory criterion that the payer 
and payee of the interest are not “associated persons”.  However, it is clear from the 
scheme of the regime, that the associated person test is only applicable at the first tier  
(i.e. the loan between NZ Subsidiary and Aust Bank.)  Unlike other regimes in the 
Act, there are no look-through rules which permit the Commissioner to attack the 
transaction on the grounds that Aust Bank has obtained finance from a second tier 
associated party (i.e. Aust Parent Co). 
There is nothing unusual in the implementation of this type of structure.  It does not 
constitute tax-avoidance, because it is clear from the July 1991 Budget and the 
associated Budget papers that the Government was aware of a wide range of complex 
structures which had been successfully used to avoid NRWT.  Accordingly, the AIL 
regime was designed to eliminate the transaction costs associated with those structures 
which were replaced with a modest payment of tax to the New Zealand Government. 
A second reason why this type of structure is unlikely to be affected by section BG 1 
is that the AIL regime is a “soak up” tax.  Non-resident lenders have a clear structural 
choice.  They can either pay NRWT and claim a credit for the NRWT against their 
home country tax liability, or they can structure the investment to achieve AIL status.  
The choice depends on the non-resident lender’s domestic tax profile.  If they can’t 
utilise the credit for NRWT then the most tax-efficient solution is to develop an AIL 
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compliant structure.  Given that AIL does not create a foreign tax credit the payment 
of NRWT would be the optimal solution if the foreign lender can “soak up” the New 
Zealand NRWT credit.  In that scenario, the foreign lender, everything else being 
equal, will be better off by the saving of AIL.   
13.4 Detachable coupons 
The same tax efficiencies can be achieved via a similar method that involves 
segregating the New Zealand subsidiary’s obligation to repay the principal and 
interest via detachable interest coupons.  The documentation should provide that, once 
the coupons have been detached, the obligation to pay interest is independent of the 
principal debt obligation. 
 
 
Diagram 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.5 Additional tax issues concerning detachable coupons 
The NZ Subsidiary will claim a full deduction on an accrual basis for the interest 
payments it makes on the debt, notwithstanding the assignment of the future interest 
payments to the Aust Bank.  From the perspective of the NZ Subsidiary, after the 
assignment, there is still only one financial arrangement.  The amount and 
deductibility of NZ Subsidiary’s interest expense is not affected by the assignment by 
Aust Parent Co of the future interest payments. 
13.6 Derivation of interest 
For the interest to be derived by the Aust Bank, it is essential that the detachable 
coupons are assigned prior to the time that the interest is due and receivable.  The first 
key issue is, if Aust Parent Co assigns the coupon just prior to the interest payment 
date, has Aust Parent Co derived accrued interest income up to the time the coupon is 
assigned to the Aust Bank?  Under New Zealand’s accrual regime, interest income is 
Aust Parent Co 
NZ Subsidiary 
 
Aust Bank 
1. Loan 
3. Pay coupons 
2. Assignment of Coupons 
4.Pay 
Principal 
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deemed to be spread over the term of the financial arrangement.  However, the accrual 
regime does not apply to non-residents. 
13.7 Validity of the assignment  
Whether the assignment of the interest coupons is valid or not depends upon the 
application of complex principles of common law and equity.  The central issue of 
who derives the income depends upon how the assignment is classified. 
There are two lines of cases that apply to the assignment of income.  The first line of 
cases is based on the Australian case of Norman v FCT  27 and the New Zealand case 
of Williams v CIR. 28 They classified a purported assignment of income as a mere 
assignment of an expectancy to a future receipt.  The effect was that the party 
transferring the interest was deemed to have derived the income notwithstanding the 
purported assignment.  Consequently when the transferee received the income, it was 
held to be an application of income. 
The second line of cases is based on the Australian case of Shepherd v FCT 29 and the 
New Zealand case of McLeay v CIR.30  They classified an assignment of income as an 
assignment of an existing right to future receipts.  Since the right was held to have 
existed at the date of the assignment, the assignee was held to have derived the 
income.  In Shepherd’s case, the taxpayer assigned his right to royalties under a 
licence agreement for the manufacture of furniture castors.  The majority of the High 
Court of Australia held that the deed of assignment was an effective assignment on 
the grounds that the contractual right to royalties, payable in the future, was an 
existing chosen action.  Being an existing chosen action it was capable of being 
presently assigned.  This was despite the fact that the quantum of income assigned 
could not be known at the time of the assignment. 
13.8 Potential NZ tax liability for Aust Parent Co on the payment for the 
assignment 
Assuming the assignment is valid, the next issue is whether the cash consideration 
paid by the Aust Bank to Aust Parent Co for the assignment is “interest” within the 
definition of section OB1.  If so, then New Zealand domestic law would impose NZ 
NRWT of 15%. 
“Interest” is defined in section OB1 as: 
Every payment (not being a repayment of money lent and not being a 
redemption payment), whether periodical or not and however described 
or computed, made by the first person to any other person (in this 
definition referred to as the ‘second person’) in respect of or in relation to 
money lent to the second person making the payment or to any other 
person. 
On a literal interpretation of this definition, the payment made by the Aust Bank to 
Aust Parent Co could arguably constitute “interest” and therefore be subject to NZ 
                                               
27 Norman v FCT [1963] 109 CLR 9.  
28 Williams v CIR [1965] NZLR 395. 
29 Shepherd v FCT [1965] 113 CLR 385. 
30 McLeay v CIR [1963] NZLR 711. 
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NRWT.  The argument is that the consideration paid by the bank to Aust Parent Co is 
a payment made to a person (Aust Parent Co) by any other person (the bank) in 
respect of or in relation to money lent to any other person (NZ Subsidiary). 
The better view is that the payment made by the Aust bank to Aust Parent Co should 
not constitute interest and consequently NZ NRWT should not apply.  The payment is 
in consideration for the assignment of future interest payments.  It is not a payment 
made “in respect of or in relation to money lent”.  At the time the payment is made, 
no amount of interest would be due on the money lent to NZ Subsidiary (i.e. the 
payment is not in respect of accrued interest on the notes).  The only payments made 
in respect of or in relation to money lent are the subsequent interest payments which 
will be made by NZ Subsidiary to the Aust Bank who is holder of the interest 
coupons. 
 
14. AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL GAINS TAX 
14.1 Introduction 
One of the major differences between the two Trans-Tasman tax sys tems is the 
absence in New Zealand of a capital gains tax (CGT).  Australia introduced a 
comprehensive CGT into the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 in 1985.  Everything 
else being equal, the Australian CGT regime represents an additional layer of 
Australian tax which would not create any imputation credits in New Zealand.  
Secondly the allocation of franking credits under the pro rata allocation solution to 
New Zealand shareholders will still encourage Trans-Tasman companies to avoid 
Australian CGT. 
14.2 A hypothetical investment 
Consider the case of a New Zealand parent company that wishes to purchase a 
commercial property in Australia.  The company believes the value of the property 
will double during the next four years.  Can it structure the acquisition and anticipated 
disposal in a way that reduces its prima facie exposure to Australian CGT? 
14.3 Australian CGT 
Taxable gains are included as part of a taxpayer’s ordinary assessable income, and are 
subject to tax at the ordinary rate.31   
An Australian resident company is subject to Australian CGT on its world-wide 
assets.  However, non-residents are only subject to Australian CGT on taxable 
Australian assets which are: 
? ? land and buildings in Australia,  
? ? any asset that has been used by a taxpayer in carrying on business through 
a permanent establishment, 
                                               
31 Indexation does not apply to assets acquired after 21/9/1999. 
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? ? shares and interests in a resident Australian private company (equivalent to 
a New Zealand close company), 
? ? shares or interests in a public company where the taxpayer (and associates) 
owns at least 10% of the issued share capital in that company, 
? ? interests in Australian partnerships or unit trusts, provided that the interest 
is greater than 10%, and 
? ? options and rights to acquire any of the above assets. 
For reasons which will become apparent later, it is important to establish the precise 
relationship between the CGT provisions and the “income tax” provisions of both the 
1936 and 1997 Acts.  The key point to note is that there is a single tax imposed by 
both Acts which reflects the limitations contained in Section 55 of the Australian 
constitution.  There is no separate “capital gains tax” imposed in Australia.  Amounts 
described as “capital gains” form part of the calculation of taxable income.  This 
conclusion is based on the following short summary of the scheme of the 1997 Act.   
The 1997 Act imposes “capital gains tax” on chargeable gains by including in a 
taxpayer’s assessable income “your net capital gain (if any) for the current year” 
(section 102-5(1)).  The phrase “assessable income” is defined as including amounts 
included in assessable income by provisions of the Act (i.e. statutory income).  This 
principle is contained in section 6.  Income tax is imposed on taxable income.  The 
phrase “taxable income” is defined as being the amount remaining after subtracting 
allowable deductions from assessable income  (see Section 4-15).  Accordingly, under 
the 1997 Act, a capital gain is (or maybe) taxed but, if it is, the tax imposed is income 
tax and it is imposed on the capital gain because it forms part of taxable income.  
This analysis is crucial when interpreting, inter alia, Article 2 of the Netherlands 
Double Tax Agreement (DTA) which deals with “taxes imposed”. 
14.4 Dual company structures.  Option A 
If the New Zealand Parent Company (NZ Parent Co) were to directly acquire the 
Australian property, the anticipated disposal would be subject to CGT.  Furthermore, 
if the NZ Parent Co were to incorporate an Australian Holding Company, which in 
turn acquired a property, a disposal of the Australian Holding Company would also be 
subject to Australian CGT.   
One method of overcoming the risk of CGT is for the NZ Parent Co to incorporate a 
subsidiary which is not a resident of Australia, which in turn incorporates an Aust 
Holding Co that acquires the property.  This structure is summarised in Diagram 8, 
below. 
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Diagram 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If NZ Parent Co were to sell Tax Haven Company (Tax Haven Co), that transaction 
would not fall within any of the charging provisions contained in the 1997 Act.  
However, the purchaser may feel uncomfortable acquiring a tax haven company as a 
vehicle for obtaining control of the Australian property.  An alternative structure is to 
use a Treaty country such as the Netherlands.  
14.5 Dual company structures.  Option B 
There are two major differences between this structure and Option A.  NZ Parent Co 
incorporates Dutch Holding Company (Dutch Holding Co) which is designed to rely 
on the favourable provisions contained in the Dutch DTA network.  
Secondly, NZ Parent Co (via Dutch Holding Co) forms an Australian Holding 
Company (Aust Holding Co) which in turn incorporates an Australian Operating 
Company (Aust Op Co) (second tier).  
The relationship between the parties is summarised in the following diagram. 
Diagram 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NZ Parent Co 
Dutch Holding Co 
Aust Op Co 
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Aust Holding Co 
 1st tier 
Vendor 
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Tax Haven Co 
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The exit strategy would involve the NZ Parent Co selling its indirect interest in the 
first tier Aust Holding Co.  That transaction is designed to take advantage of Article 
13 of the Australia-Netherlands DTA.   
14.6 Article 13 of the New Zealand-Australia DTA 
What would be the position if the NZ Parent Co omitted the Dutch Holding Co and 
directly acquired the share capital of the Australian first tier company.  The difficulty 
with that proposed structure is that Article 13 of the NZ-Australian DTA would 
permit the ATO to impose CGT on the disposal of the first tier Australian company. 
The mere holding by NZ Parent Co of shares in the first tier Australian company is 
not sufficient to create a permanent establishment in Australia.  Accordingly, Article 7 
would, prima facie, provide Treaty relief on the grounds that a shareholding does not 
of itself create a permanent establishment and therefore Australia cannot tax the 
proceeds.  However, Article 7(8) provides that where any item of income is dealt with 
under another provision of the agreement, then the other Article which is applicable is 
not overridden by Article 7. 
Article 13 of the DTA deals with the alienation of personal property.  The main 
provisions are: 
Article 13(1) Income, profits or gains derived by a resident of [New 
Zealand] from the alienation of real property situated in [Australia] may 
be taxed in that other State. [Australia] 
Article 13(3) Income, profits or gains derived by a resident of [New 
Zealand] from the alienation of shares or comparable interests in a 
company, the assets of which consist wholly or principally of real 
property situated in [Australia], may be taxed in that other State. 
[Australia] 
Article 13(5) Nothing in this agreement affects the application of a 
law of [Australia] relating to the taxation of gains of a capital nature 
derived from the alienation of any property other than that to which any 
of the preceding paragraphs of this Article apply. 
Article 13(5) was inserted into the DTA to overcome the problem associated with the 
decision of the Australian Federal Court in FCT v Lamesa Holdings BV.32 
14.7 Lamesa 
This case is a classic case of Treaty shopping.  An Australia Target Company (Aust 
Target Co) was acquired via a Dutch Holding Co which in turn was owned by an 
American entity.  The structure is illustrated in the following diagram.  
 
 
 
                                               
32 FCT v Lamesa Holdings BV (1977) 36 ATR 589. 
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Diagram 10 
From case: FCT v Lamesa Holdings BV (1977) 36 ATR 589. 
Australian Company
- 2nd tier : ARM
Dutch Holding Company
(Lamesa )
Australian Holding 
Company - 1st tier : ARL
USA Entity
100%
100%
100%
Vendor Public Float
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100%
Target Co
- 3rd Tier : Arimco
Target Sub
4th Tier : Arimco Mining
Mining Rights
 
The US entity was a limited partnership and it acquired the taxpayer Lamesa, which 
was a company incorporated in the Netherlands (Dutch Holding Co).  Lamesa 
acquired an Australian company (Aust Holding Co – 1st tier) called Australian 
Resources Limited (ARL).  ARL acquired another Australian company called 
Australian Resources Mining Pty Ltd (ARM – 2nd tier).  ARM made a successful on the 
market takeover (Aust Target Co – 3rd tier) of an Australian resource company known 
as Arimco NL (Arimco) which had as one of its wholly owned subsidiaries Target 
Subsidiary Company (Target Sub Co –  4th  tier) (a company called Arimco Mining 
Pty Ltd (Arimco Mining).  That company held valuable gold mining leases.   
Two years after the takeover, the group was offered to the public via the issue of new 
capital, which was quoted on the Australian stock exchange.  Lamesa made a profit in 
excess of $A200m from selling its stake in ARL (Aust Holding Co – 1st tier) in two 
tranches.  Lamesa accepted that the profit was part of its assessable income under the 
1936 Act.  However, it claimed the protection of the business profits article in the 
Australia/Netherlands DTA.  Its case was based on Article 7 (Business Profits) which 
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is based on the 1997 OECD model convention.  The facts in Lamesa clearly disclosed 
that the taxpayer (Dutch Holding Co) did not carry on business in Australia via a 
permanent establishment.   
14.8 Article 13 of the Australian-Netherlands DTA 
The Dutch DTA is similar to the New Zealand-Australia DTA.  In both instances 
Article 7 contains the general rule that the country of source can only tax a resident of 
the other country if the resident has created a permanent establishment (PE) in the 
country of source.  In Lamesa, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) accepted that Lamesa 
had not created a PE in Australia.  Article 7(5) of the Australian-Netherlands DTA 
provides that any transaction falling within, inter alia, Article 13 is subject to tax in 
Australia (the source country).  Article 13(1) of the Australia-Netherlands DTA 
provides that income from the alienation of real property may be taxed in Australia.   
Article 13(2)(a)(iii) provides that the term “real property” includes, inter alia, shares 
in a company the assets of which consist wholly or principally of direct interests in or 
over land in Australia.  Diagram 10 clearly demonstrates that Lamesa sold its 
shareholding to the public in the Aust Holding Co.  If Article 13(2)(a)(iii) is read 
literally, then the disposal of the holding company is not a transaction that falls within 
that paragraph.  It would only constitute a taxable event if the Treaty permitted the 
ATO to look through the chain of companies and adopt a substance-based 
interpretation. 
14.9 Article 13 of the New Zealand-Netherlands DTA  - A double edged sword 
It is important to note, that there is nothing to prevent an Aust Parent Co from 
adopting a reverse structure to eliminate the payment of either New Zealand income 
tax, or alternatively the payment of NRWT on the remission (via a dividend) of any 
profit derived from the disposal of a New Zealand sourced asset.  In view of the 
similarity between Article 13 of the Australia-Netherlands DTA, and Article 13 of the 
New Zealand-Netherlands DTA, the approach taken by the Federal Court in Lamesa 
is equally applicable to a New Zealand-based investment which seeks to rely on the 
New Zealand-Netherlands DTA. 
The key feature of the New Zealand-Netherlands DTA is that business profits are also 
dealt with in Article 7, which contains the general rule that New Zealand can only tax 
a Dutch resident on any New Zealand sourced business income that is effectively 
connected to a PE.  The mere ownership of shares in a New Zealand company by a 
Dutch resident does not create a PE.  The essential features of Article 13 are as 
follows. 
Article 13(1). Income or gains derived by a resident of [the 
Netherlands] from the alienation of real property referred to in Article 6 
and situated in [New Zealand] may be taxed in that other State. 
Article 13(4). Income or gains from the alienation of any property 
other than that referred to in paragraphs 1… shall be taxable only in the 
State of which the alienator is a resident [i.e. the Netherlands]. 
Note that Article 13 of the New Zealand-Netherlands DTA is easier to circumvent 
than Article 13 of the Australia-Netherlands DTA, because the comparable New 
Zealand provision does not contain an equivalent to Article 13(2)(a)(iii) of the 
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Australia-Netherlands DTA.  Accordingly, the structure can be simplified via the 
deletion of a second tier New Zealand company. 
14.10 The judgement of the Federal Court in Lamesa 
The disposal mechanism consisted of Lamesa arranging for the Aust Holding Co to 
float its Australian share capital to the Australian public.  The profit realised by 
Lamesa was approximately $200 million.  That gain would constitute assessable 
income if the transaction were caught by Article 13 of the DTA. 
The issue before the Federal Court was whether the assets owned by the initial target 
subsidiary could be treated as assets of the Aust Holding Co. 
The ATO’s primary submission was that the phrase “shares or comparable interests in 
a company” authorised a substance approach.  The corporate veil of the subsidiary 
companies, which were interposed between Lamesa and the mining leases, should be 
lifted for tax purposes, thereby treating the mining leases as constituting the assets of 
ARL.  Under this interpretation, Australia would have had the primary taxing rights 
because the assets of the group were comprised “principally of direct interests in or 
over land” in Australia within the meaning of Article 13(a)(iii). 
14.11 “… The assets of which… ” 
The Federal Court was not prepared to construe the phrase “… the assets of which… ” 
as extending down the chain of subsidiaries to the mining leases.  The phrase was 
given a literal meaning.  The assets of ARL (the Aust Holding Co) comprised the 
100% shareholding in ARM (the 2nd tier company), and not the mining licences owned 
by Arimco Mining (the 4th tier company).   The Federal Court was clearly concerned 
about the implications of authorising a look-through in situations where the ownership 
was not via a chain of 100% owned subsidiaries.  How would the ATO interpret this 
Article if, for example, Lamesa had only owned 51% of the 1st tier company?  This 
was clearly a real possibility, because Lamesa had sold down its shareholding in two 
public floatations.  The Court observed that: 
…  it is equally possible as a matter of policy that the legislature chose to 
limit the assimilation in Art 13 of shares to realty only to one tier of 
companies so as to avoid the kinds of melancholy complication [sic] 
which arise where multitudinous tiers are involved and with potentially 
varying percentage ownership interests. 
The degree of complexity required would, no doubt, depend upon 
whether the policy was to deal only with wholly owned subsidiaries on 
the one hand or whether it would be intended to extend to lesser 
percentage ownership.  While it will be recalled that in the 1994 year of 
income Lamesa held virtually 100 per cent of ARL, that was not the 
situation in 1996, by which time Lamesa held only 67.35%.  But what if 
ARL had, instead of owning 100% of ARM, owned 75%?  Would the 
assimilation be intended to operate as a matter of policy?  What if the 
percentage ownership were 51%?  The same questions can be asked at 
other levels in the chain of ownership to which the facts of the present 
case relate. 33 
                                               
33 See n 32,  p 598 line 10 and line 20. 
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15. DO AUSTRALIAN DTAs PROVIDE TREATY PROTECTION? 
15.1 The significance of Lamesa structures 
The US investors entered Australia indirectly via the Netherlands.  Why did they do 
that, and what would have been the position if they had made a direct investment?  
These questions have been answered by Ian Gzell in an important article.34 
Gzell notes at page 75 that under the Netherlands participation exemption, dividends 
and other profit distributions, including capital gains arising on the disposal of shares 
in a foreign entity, are excluded from Dutch corporate income tax.  The participation 
exemption effectively meant that the Netherlands became a “dividend trap” to defer 
the payment of any US tax arising from the float of the Australian investment.  
According to Gzell, subpart F of the US Code was unlikely to apply because the 
limited partnership could satisfy the “safe harbour” rules.  This was because it had 
fifteen special partners.35 
In Lamesa, the ATO did not rely on Part IV(a) (the general anti-avoidance provision) 
of the 1936 Act.  Could the ATO have argued that the imposition of the Dutch 
company between the US investors and ARL (1st tier company) should be set aside for 
tax purposes under Part IV(a) on the grounds that, but for the “scheme”, the US 
investors would have invested directly into Australia?  The answer is no.  The 
$A200m would still have qualified for treaty protection.  Article 7 (business profits) 
of the Australian-US DTA would have provided treaty protection, because the 
American partnership would not have created a PE in Australia.  Secondly, Article 13 
(taxation of capital gains) of the Australian-US DTA is similar to the Australia-
Netherlands Treaty in that it only deals with the taxation of real property.   
Article 13(2)(b) defines the term “real property” as land and also “shares or 
comparable interests in a company, the assets of which consist wholly or principally 
of real property situated in Australia.”  Once again, there is no look-through provision 
in this article and any attempt by the ATO to impose Australian CGT under Article 13 
would also have failed.   
Lamesa is important whenever the investment involves immovable property and/or 
the share capital of a company whose principal asset consists of the immovable 
property.  Lamesa established that Article 13 of the Australia-Netherlands DTA did 
not contain a look-through rule and accordingly it is a relatively simple exercise to 
devise a multi-tier structure, which circumvents the limited taxing right conferred by 
that article.  The same is true of Article 13 in the Australia-USA DTA, and Article 13 
of the New Zealand-Netherlands DTA.   
15.2 Moveable property 
What then is the level of treaty protection available to a non-resident investor who 
acquires moveable property or intangible property?  Is there any treaty protection? 
                                               
34 Ian Gzell QC, “Treaty-shopping” (June 1998) Vol 27 Australian Tax Review pp 65-78. 
35 See n 34, p 76. 
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Recently the ATO stated publicly that a non-resident of Australia cannot obtain  treaty 
protection against CGT under Australia’s pre CGT Double Tax Agreements.36  This 
important issue will be considered in the context of two of the twenty-three pre CGT 
DTAs, namely the Netherlands (1976) and Denmark (1981).  These two treaties have 
been selected because of the fact that neither country taxes Australian-sourced income 
under its domestic law.  They are suitable dividend trap countries.  
From a New Zealand perspective, they can also play an effective role despite the fact 
that both the Netherlands and Denmark are CFCs.  A New Zealand company 
investing in Australia via Denmark or the Netherlands is able to avoid Australian 
corporate tax and thereby create imputation credits for resident New Zealand 
shareholders.   
15.3 TR 2001/12 
This final ruling deals with the controversial topics of income tax, capital gains tax, 
and pre CGT tax DTAs.  The importance of this debate is confirmed by the fact that 
the New Zealand-Australia DTA contains a specific article which preserves 
Australia’s right to tax capital gains under the 1936 and 1996 Acts.  Accordingly, the 
debate revolves around the absence of any comparable provision in Australia’s pre-
CGT treaties.  The ATO’s position is summarised in the following quotation.  
While noting there are alternative arguments the ATO adheres to the 
view that Australia’s right to tax capital gains was not limited by pre 
CGT treaties.  The ATO considers that taxes on capital gains are not 
taxes to which pre CGT treaties apply.  Even if this is not the case, the 
source rules of pre CGT treaties do not limit domestic law taxing rights 
of capital gains.37 
The correctness of the ATO view is not based on any particular point or argument.  
Their case revolves around a number of indicators.  The context in which the twenty 
treaties were negotiated is central to the ATO interpretation of those treaties.  For 
example, context is said to be relevant in deciding under the “taxes covered article” 
whether CGT is similar to the “Australian income taxes”, which existed prior to the 
introduction of CGT. 
Despite the judgement of the Federal Court in Lamesa and the earlier decision of the 
High Court in Thiel v FCT, the analysis contained in final ruling TR 2001/12 has not 
been rigorously tested in the Australian courts.  From a potential New Zealand 
investor’s perspective there is some doubt surrounding the validity of the ATO 
position.  The following arguments, which are discussed more fully by Ian Gzell38, 
strongly suggest that the views expressed by the ATO in the final ruling is mistaken.   
The competing arguments are summarised by the ATO39.  In considering whether 
CGT is a tax to which a pre-CGT treaty applies, a key requirement is that the CGT 
                                               
36 ATO final taxation ruling TR  2001/12 “Income tax and capital gains tax: capital gains in pre CGT treaties” 62 pages issued on 
19 December 2001. 
37 See n 36, pp 5-7 paragraphs 14-18. 
38 Ian Gzell QC, “Treaty-shopping” (June 1998) Vol 27 Australian Tax Review pp 65-78. 
 
39 ATO final taxat ion ruling TR 2001/12 “Income tax and capital gains tax: capital gains in pre CGT treaties” 62 pages issued on 
19 December 2001, pp 10-11 paragraphs 26-28. 
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was considered to be one of the taxes imposed at the time of signature (usually by 
Australia as “Australian income tax”) or that CGT was substantially similar to an 
existing tax.  According to the ATO, the CGT regime does not satisfy either of these 
tests.  The alternative view argues “Australian income tax” effectively included a 
capital gains tax at the time when most of the pre-CGT treaties were signed.  Section 
26AAA, for example, was always seen as a pure tax on capital gains.  The CGT 
merely extended the range of transactions subject to tax.  Accordingly CGT is “an 
existing tax” or alternatively is substantially similar to an existing tax and is therefore 
a tax to which pre-CGT treaties apply.  The views of international tax authors and 
decisions of a foreign tribunal are quoted to support the view that the insertion of Part 
IIIA into the 1936 Act did not amount to the introduction of a new tax. 
15.4 Taxes covered 
In the context of the Australia-Netherlands DTA, the key point is that there is no 
reference to capital gains in Article 2 (taxes covered).  This could indicate that the 
treaty does not apply to CGT.  However, the term “Australian income tax” is 
undefined. Therefore Article 3(3) includes the domestic law interpretation.  The 
commentary on the corresponding article of the model convention states that article 
3(3) of this treaty is ambulatory.  Terms which are not defined should be interpreted 
according to the domestic law which is in force at the time when the treaty is being 
applied.  This approach is supported by Article 3(2) of the 1992 model which was 
amended in 1995 to support the ambulatory approach.  
If Article 2 applied today, then for the reasons noted above there would be a strong 
case for arguing that the reference to “Australian income tax” in this treaty covers 
capital gains.  Section 4-10 of the 1997 Act provides that income tax is calculated by 
reference to taxable income.  That phrase is equal to assessable income less allowable 
deductions (ss4-15).  As noted above, net capital gains are included in assessable 
income by virtue of ss102-5 of the 1997 Act.  Under the ambulatory approach CGT 
would constitute Australian income tax and would be eligible for the treaty protection 
contained in Article 7.   
It is also significant to note that the second protocol to the Netherlands treaty was 
concluded in 1986, which was after the introduction of CGT.  There is no reference in 
the description of taxes covered to CGT.  An inference can be drawn that it is unlikely 
Australia’s comprehensive CGT regime was unintentionally omitted when the 
protocol was negotiated thereby ensuring that it did not cover CGT.  
Furthermore, a negative inference can be drawn from the fact that there is no specific 
reference to CGT as an “existing tax” in any Australian post-CGT treaties.  Similar 
expressions are used to describe “Australian income” tax in both pre- and post-CGT 
treaties.  This also suggests that pre-CGT treaties were intended to cover capital gains 
tax.   
Finally, the specific extension of Australian income tax to cover any identical or 
substantially similar tax creates further problems for the ATO.  Section 26AAA is a 
form of capital gains tax and was in force at the time the Netherlands treaty was 
entered into.  Accordingly, the introduction of a comprehensive CGT regime merely 
extended the range of transactions which were covered by that tax.  Therefore, CGT is 
either an “existing tax” or is substantially similar to an “e xisting tax” and is a tax to 
which the Netherlands treaty applies. 
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These interpretations are supported by the weight of academic opinion.  For example, 
Professor Vogel40 has stated that the taxation of capital gains is normally dealt with 
within income tax law, and any new capital gains tax will normally be considered for 
treaty purposes as being at least similar to income tax. 
For all of these reasons the Ruling’s conclusion is highly questionable because 
Australia does not have a separate CGT.  Part IIIA added net capital gains to the 
classes of income that are taxable under the 1936 and 1996 Acts. 
15.5 Practical considerations 
Finally there are a number of serious practical difficulties which would arise if the 
ATO views are correct.  Under all of the pre-CGT Treaties, the treaty partner is 
required to give a credit for taxes paid in Australia.  Are the treaty partners required to 
ignore tax paid by Australian resident companies on capital gains, when calculating 
the available credit to non-resident shareholders for underlying Australian tax? 
If so, how is the amount of the CGT to be determined?  What if the company had a 
large net capital gain but because of other transactions derived no taxable income, and 
therefore paid no Australian tax?  To treat the introduction of CGT as a new tax for 
DTA purposes would be also inconsistent with the practical application of pre-CGT 
treaties. 
15.6 Article 7 Business profits 
Article 7 of the Australia-Netherlands DTA provides that Australia can only tax the 
“profits of an enterprise” of the Netherlands if that enterprise carries on business in 
Australia through a permanent establishment.  Assuming there is no PE, the issue then 
becomes whether the expression “profits of an enterprise” encompasses capital gains.  
If the answer to that question is ‘yes’ then CGT is not applicable.  The views of the 
ATO are summarised at pages 30-35 of TR 2001/12.  The corresponding arguments 
are summarised by Gzell41 at pp 27-29 of his second important article on this topic. 
The ATO argument is that where a country such as Australia distinguishes between 
income and capital gains you would not expect article 7 to deal with capital gains.  
The argument is based on the fact that Australia has made a reservation to article 13 
of the OECD model (which deals with capital gains) and did not make a reservation 
against article 7.   
The answer to the ATO's contentions lies in a combination of the following 
provisions.  Section 3(2) of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 provides that 
in relation to “Australian tax” a reference to “taxable income derived from an activity 
or business shall be read as a reference to taxable income derived from that activity 
unless the context otherwise requires”.  As noted above,  “taxable income” is defined 
in ss4-15 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (the 1997 Act) as assessable 
income less allowable deductions.  Sections 102-5 of the 1997 Act specifically 
includes net capital gains in a taxpayer’s assessable income.  Accordingly, the term 
“profits” in Article 7 must include availability of capital gains and treaty protection.   
                                               
40 Klaus Vogel, “Klaus Vogel on double tax conventions” in Kluwer Law International (3rd ed, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International,1997) p 157. 
41 Ian Gzell QC “Treaty protection from capital gains tax” (March 2000) Vol 29 Australian Tax Review pp 25-49. 
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Further support for this interpretation is contained in Article 6(a) of the first protocol 
to the Australia-Netherlands DTA.  That provision states:  
Where one of the states is entitled to tax the profits of an enterprise, that 
state may treat as profits of an enterprise, profits on the alienation of 
capital assets of the enterprise, not being profits that consist of income to 
which paragraph (1) of article 13 applies.   
Finally, further support is provided by obiter dicta comments of the full Federal Court 
in Lamesa that: 
… generally, the double tax treaty leaves profits from the alienation of 
shares to be dealt with under article 7 in the context of an enterprise. 
15.7 Would the activities of a Dutch dividend trap company constitute an 
“enterprise of one of the states”? 
This issue is not discussed by either Gzell or the ATO.  The term “enterprise” is not 
defined in the Australia-Netherlands DTA.  However, in Thiel, the High Court 
considered the application of Article 7(1) of the Australia-Switzerland DTA, which is 
identical to Article 7 of the Netherlands treaty.  The majority of the High Court 
concluded that the term “enterprise” may include an activity, or activities, that consist 
of one or more transactions provided they were entered into for business or 
commercial purposes. 
Based on the decisions of the Australian courts in FCT v Total Holdings Pty Ltd 42 
and Esquire Nominees Ltd v FCT43, the holding of shares can constitute a business. 
15.8 Will the Dutch treaty apply if there is no double taxation because of the 
participation exemption in the Netherlands? 
The structure adopted by the taxpayers in Lamesa was designed to eliminate 
Australian and Dutch income tax payable on the realised capital profit.  If Dutch law 
does not impose any tax on the gain, is it open for the ATO to argue that the treaty 
does not apply on the grounds that there is no double taxation? 
This argument is not discussed by either the ATO in TR2001/12 or Gzell.  It is 
however a straw man.   
The full Federal Court in Lamesa held that unless it could be shown that one of the 
objects and purposes of the Netherlands Treaty was to ensure that tax was paid in one 
of the contracting states, the treaty would still be applicable.  This was in spite of the 
fact that there is no double taxation (or for that matter any taxation) payable in either 
treaty country.   
                                               
42 FCT v Total Holdings Pty Ltd 79 ATC 42719. 
43 Esquire Nominees Ltd v FCT 73 ATC 41141. 
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16. THE IMPACT OF THE PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION IN 
THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK 
16.1 Treaty shopping 
The facts of Lamesa are a classic example of how treaty shopping occurs.  Instead of 
investing directly into Australia, the limited liability partnership established a Dutch 
company that undertook the investment. 
The rationale for treaty shopping has been summarised by Edwardes-Ker44 as follows: 
Because tax treaty benefits cannot be denied to those proving their 
entitlement to such benefits, treaty shopping may be advantageous.  
Treaty shopping typically arises because no (or only an unattractive) tax 
treaty exists between an investor’s resident state and a source state.  The 
treaty shopping investor will then typically decide to establish a (base or 
conduit) company or other entity allegedly resident in a third state.  This 
entity will then seek to claim the benefits of an attractive tax treaty 
between this third state and the source state. 
16.2 Participation exemptions 
Treaty shopping is not only synonymous with tax havens.  The Netherlands is not the 
only European country to include as part of their domestic law the concept of a 
“participation” exemption.  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey have enacted similar 
legislation.  One of the most popular participation exemptions is the Dutch regime, 
which is briefly discussed by  Gzell at page 75.45  Subject to commercial 
considerations, there is very little to choose between the participation exemptions 
contained in some of the other countries.  For the purposes of contrast, the 
participation exemption offered by Denmark will be examined.  
The tax advantage sought by the taxpayer in Lamesa primarily depended upon the role 
played by the Dutch holding company.  Whilst it is true that the Australia-US DTA 
had comparable articles to the Australia-Netherlands DTA, the whole point of the 
Dutch company was to shelter the Australian profit from US corporation tax.  As 
noted above, the US CFC regime (subpart F) did not apply.  The Dutch holding 
company could play the role of a classic “dividend trap”. 
An understanding of the “participation exemption” will provide a useful insight into 
this aspect of international tax planning.  Because of the extensive Dutch treaty 
network, countries such as the Netherlands are, everything else being equal, superior 
to classic tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda or the Cayman 
Islands.  
In addition to the participation exemption there are a number of aspects of the Dutch 
tax system which could be of interest to a New Zealand parent company with 
Australian investments.  These include: 
                                               
44  Michael Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation, the International Tax Treaty Service (London, Indepth Publishers, 1997 
update) paragraph 58.02. 
45 Ian Gzell QC, “Treaty-shopping” (June 1998) Vol 27 Australian Tax Review pp 65-78. 
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? ? an extensive network of double tax agreements, 
? ? no withholding tax on interest payments, 
? ? no withholding tax on royalty payments, 
? ? no withholding tax on dividends where the European Community 
(EC) parent-subsidiary directive applies, and 
? ? the ability to obtain an advance ruling from the Dutch revenue authorities. 
These are some of the reasons why Dutch holding, finance, and royalty companies are 
becoming a common feature of international tax structures.  
For example, under the Netherlands’ treaty network, the rate of withholding tax on 
dividends varies between nil, 5%, 10% or 15%.46  In respect of interest and royalty 
payments the withholding tax rate is nil where the shareholding qualifies for the 
participation exemption and the shares form part of a company whose activities are 
carried on in the Netherlands.   
16.3 The Netherlands participation exemption 
One of the main advantages of the participation exemption is that dividends received 
by a Dutch company from an equity participation in a foreign company are exempt 
from Dutch corporation tax.  The underlying philosophy is that dividends, which are 
paid out of profits that have already been subjected to corporate tax, should not be 
taxed a second time.  Furthermore, the exemption also applies to capital gains realised 
on the disposal of the shares in the foreign subsidiary.   
To qualify for the participation exemption the following conditions must be satisfied: 
? ? The participation must be at least 5% of the nominal paid up share capital 
of the participant. 
? ? The participation may not be held as inventory or trading stock. 
? ? The profit derived by the foreign participant must have been subject to a 
form of income tax levied by the foreign state. 
? ? The participation must not be held by the Dutch company solely as a 
“portfolio” investment, which means the Dutch company should 
generally conduct business that is considered as an extension of its parent 
company’s business. 
Furthermore, it is possible to obtain an advance ruling that determines whether the 
shareholding in the foreign subsidiary is held as a portfolio investment or as a current 
asset and whether the shareholding qualifies for the participation exemption.  The 
advance ruling will last for four years with an option to renew it for a further four year 
period.   
16.4 Netherlands-Antilles 
It is no coincidence that multinational structures often incorporate a Netherlands 
Antilles entity.  That company is designed to reduce Dutch withholding tax on the 
repatriation of the profit from the Netherlands to the ultimate holding company.  In 
                                               
46 J Von Haaren,   “Netherlands” in Guides to European Taxation: the Taxation of Companies in Europe, ed. J Kesti (The Hague, 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, October 2001) p 421. 
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the context of Trans-Tasman profit repatriation (where the objective is to maximise 
home country taxation thereby creating shareholder credits) the reduction of all 
foreign taxes is an important feature of the structure.   
A key feature of the Netherlands-Antilles domestic law is that dividends received 
from foreign participations are taxed at one-tenth of the corporation’s normal tax rate, 
provided the profits on which the dividends are sourced have been subject to tax in the 
country of origin.  Generally speaking, a participation is defined as a shareholding that 
is not held as a portfolio investment.  The primary test is that a shareholding will 
qualify as a participation if it constitutes 10% or more of the share capital of the 
foreign company.   
Under the Netherlands-Antilles DTA47 the rate of withholding tax is 5%.  
Consequently the total withholding tax in the Netherlands, and corporate taxation in 
the Netherlands-Antilles, amounts to approximately 8%.  On 7 September 2001, the 
Dutch under-secretary of Finance, Wouter Bos, announced that a Bill to amend the tax 
agreement for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (which is the tax treaty between the 
Netherlands, the Netherlands-Antilles and Aruba) would adjust the effective total tax 
burden to 8.3%.   
16.5 The Danish participation exemption 
Danish Holding Companies – A Tax Paradise in International Tax Planning48 is the 
title of a recent article that extols the virtues of the new Danish holding company 
regime which took effect on 1 January 1999. The main advantage that the Danish 
regime has over a typical Dutch-Netherlands-Antilles structure is that Denmark has 
abolished dividend withholding tax.  Under the new regime, Danish holding 
companies can receive dividends free of Danish tax even if the dividends are sourced 
from a tax haven subsidiary.  Furthermore, there is no Danish dividend withholding 
tax on any dividend paid to the foreign parent company, even if it is also located in a 
tax haven.  The only restriction is that the Danish holding company must not 
constitute a “financial company”.   
One Danish legal adviser predicted that: 
Many multinationals from the United States, Japan, Canada and many 
other countries will be looking closely at Denmark.  So, too, will all 
investors investing via tax havens into countries with a dividend 
withholding tax.  As a consequence of the latter group investing via 
Denmark, it is expected that the majority of investments held in 
Netherlands-Antilles owned Dutch holding companies will move from the 
Dutch company to a Danish company.  This is expected to cost the 
Netherlands and Netherlands-Antilles hundreds of millions of dollars.  
Not only will the new law have a very significant impact on the 
Netherlands-Antilles and the Netherlands, but it will also be noticed in 
Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta.49 
                                               
47 For further information see PricewaterhouseCoopers “Corporate Taxes 2001-2002 Worldwide Summaries” John Wiley & Sons 
pp 568-577. 
48 (2001) [Online]. [Cited 21 September 2001].  Available from: 
www.hallerup.com/dokumeter/nyheder/Danish%20Holdings%20Companies.htm. 
49 Sheltons-International Tax Counsel.  2001. The Danish Holding Company [Online].  [Cited 21 September 2001].  Available 
from: http://www.enbfn.com/arts/shelton.htm pp 1-17 at p 8. 
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The following is a summary of the balance of the above article.50 
In view of Denmark’s extensive treaty network, and everything else being equal, a 
Danish holding company would have considerable attraction in view of the fact that 
the treaty network reduces the rate of dividend withholding tax to nil in respect of 
qualifying companies.   
The main restriction is that the dividends must not be derived by a “financial 
company”.  At first sight this appears to constitute a significant restriction because a 
financial company is defined as an entity which earns at least 33.33% of its gross 
income in the form of financial income or whose assets are at least 33.33% financial 
assets.  Financial income is defined as income from interest, dividends, royalties, real 
estate, lease premiums, insurance premiums and any profit on the sale of financial 
assets. The sale of financial assets is defined as assets which create financial income.   
However, there is an important restriction known as the “same country holding 
company.”51 In the context of Trans-Tasman investment structures, the exemption 
would apply to a structure whereby a Danish company owned an Australian holding 
company which in turn owned a second Australian company.  The top tier Australian 
company would constitute a financial company but if the second tier Australian 
company was an operating company, then the top company is consolidated with the 
operating company and the tests are applied to the consolidated group’s income.   
Provided a member of the consolidated group is earning sufficient active income, the 
structure would not constitute a “financial company”.   
The only apparent downside of a Danish holding company is that the exemption from 
Danish capital gains tax on ly applies if the Danish subsidiary has held its 25% 
shareholding in the subsidiary for at least three years.  The comparable Dutch 
provision provides that the participation is based on a minimum shareholding of 5% 
and there is no three-year time limit.   
In the context of Trans-Tasman repatriation strategies, there appears to be an 
advantage in incorporating a Danish holding company into the structure because of 
the lower effective tax cost, compared with an 8.3% rate associated with a 
Netherlands, Netherlands-Antilles structure. 
17. WAYS TO COMBAT TREATY SHOPPING 
17.1 Introduction  
According to Gzell52, treaty shopping has only become a problem for Australia since 
the 1980s.  He notes that a 1978 study of international tax avoidance (Rotterdam 
Report) contained only one short mention on the abuse of tax treaties.  However, by 
                                               
50 For further information see PricewaterhouseCoopers “Corporate Taxes 2001-2002 Worldwide Summaries” John Wiley & Sons 
pp 568-577. 
51 Sheltons-International Tax Counsel.  2001. The Danish Holding Company [Online].  [Cited 21 September 2001].  Available 
from: http://www.enbfn.com/arts/shelton.htm pp 1-17 at p 10. 
52 I V Gzell, “Treaty protection from capital gains tax” (March 2000) Vol 29 Australian Tax Review pp 25-49. 
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1987, treaty shopping had become more fashionable.  In 1987, the OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs published a series of reports on international tax avoidance and 
evasion.  The third report, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit 
Companies, analyses a number of ways in which treaty shopping could be countered.  
They include the following. 
17.2 Domestic law solutions - Australia 
One possible solution would be for a country to rely on its general anti-avoidance rule 
(GAAR).  However, care must be taken in the drafting of such a provision to ensure 
that it correctly encompasses the essential mechanisms whereby double taxation is 
eliminated under a DTA.  The Australian experience demonstrates a GAAR will often 
not apply because it is directed towards domestic tax avoidance arrangements. 
The Australian general anti-avoidance provision was inserted into the 1936 Act as 
Part IVA.  What would have happened if the ATO had attempted in Lamesa to argue 
that the imposition of the Dutch company between the US special partnership and 
ARL in Australia (top tier company) should be ignored on the grounds that it 
constituted a scheme?  The ATO would have presumably argued that a direct 
investment would not have created the tax advantages applicable under the 
Australian-Netherlands treaty.  For the purposes of argument only, it must be assumed 
that there are no comparable provisions in the Australia-USA DTA.53 
However, Part IVA of the 1936 Act only applies to a scheme that produces a tax 
benefit, as defined.  The only type of benefit which could apply is defined in 
s177C(1)(a) which refers to an amount which is not included in the taxpayers 
assessable income, which, but for the scheme, might reasonably have been expected 
to be included in the taxpayers’ assessable income.   
The issue becomes whether the scheme created a benefit which was comprised of an 
exclusion of the $A200m profit from the Dutch company’s assessable income.  The 
answer is clearly no because the facts in Lamesa disclosed that the profit was taxable 
under s25(1)(b) of the 1936 Act.  However, the effect of the Australia-Netherlands 
treaty was to eliminate Australia’s prima facie right to tax the profit under that 
provision.  The scheme did not create an exclusion from assessable income for the 
purposes of Part IVA of the 1936 Act. 
Under Australian domestic law, the profit from the sale of ARL Ltd was included in 
the taxpayer’s assessable income but, under the Australian-Netherlands DTA, 
Australians’ right to tax that income was repealed.  In other words, the treaty did not 
operate upon the taxpayer’s assessable income.  Its effect was to limit the ability of 
the ATO to impose income tax under Australian domestic law. 
17.3 Do Treaties over-ride the New Zealand position? 
If double tax treaties were to over-ride New Zealand domestic law, they could 
prevent, or at the very least limit, the application of any subsequent legislation which 
was designed to prevent treaty shopping. 
                                               
53 Clearly this is not the case because Article 7 and Article 13 of the Australia-USA DTA achieve the same effect as the 
comparable provisions in the Australia-Netherlands DTA.   
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Section BH 1 of the Act outlines the relationship between a DTA and New Zealand 
domestic law.  The general principle is outlined in section BH 1(3) that provides that a 
DTA shall have effect notwithstanding anything in the Act or in any other enactment.  
Similar provisions are contained in Australia which, via the Income Tax (International 
Agreements) Act, incorporates into Australian domestic law the impact of a DTA.  
However this principle is limited when domestic legislation is subsequently enacted 
that is clearly intended to over-ride the DTA. The doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty prevails.  Given the similarity between subpart BH of the Act, and the 
comparable United Kingdom provision, the decision of the House of Lords in two 
well known cases effectively means that New Zealand could enact legislation to 
prevent treaty shopping and it would be given effect despite any contrary provision in 
a DTA.   
17.4 Collco Dealings Ltd v IRC 54   
This case concerned a dividend-stripping scheme which was designed to take 
advantage of the UK-Irish DTA.  After the treaty was entered into, legislation was 
enacted to limit the impact of dividend-stripping arrangements.  The House of Lords 
correctly held that where the legislation was unambiguous it must be given effect even 
if it was contrary to international law.  The anti-dividend-stripping legislation applied 
to all shareholders, including an Irish shareholders, even if its application resulted in a 
breach of the UK-Irish DTA.   
17.5 Woodend (K V Ceylon Rubber & Tea Co Ltd ) v IRC55 
The DTA between United Kingdom and Ceylon contained a non-discrimination 
article.  Subsequently, the Ceylonese Legislature imposed a tax on certain remittances 
by resident companies, and the legislation appeared to conflict with the relevant 
provision in the DTA.  The Privy Council held that the legislation prevailed because it 
was intended to tax all remittances, including those paid to United Kingdom residents. 
17.6 Domestic law : a specific GAAR 
In 1997, s894 was introduced into the US Internal Revenue Code.  That provision 
effectively provides that reduced treaty rates under US DTAs will only apply if the 
payment to the entity is treated as income derived by a resident of the applicable 
treaty country, the resident is the beneficial owner of the income, and all other 
requirements under the treaty are satisfied. 
There was extensive US authority which established that this type of unilateral action 
would override USA’s international treaty obligations.56   
17.7 Bilateral solutions 
According to Gzell,57 the USA inserted into a number of double tax treaties a general 
provision58.  The provision allows that any reduction in the rate of source country tax 
                                               
54 Collco Dealings Ltd v IRC (1961) 1 All ER 762 HL. 
55 Woodend (K V Ceylon Rubber & Tea Co Ltd) v IRC (1970) 2 All ER 801 PC. 
56 Ian Gzell QC, “Treaty-shopping” (June 1998) Vol 27 Australian Tax Review pp 69-70. 
57 See n 56, pp 69-70. 
58 See n 56, p 70. 
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on dividends, interest or royalties will not apply if the recipient pays less than the 
general rate of corporate tax and is not owned to at least 75% by individuals who are 
resident in the other contracting state.59 
In the case of the Australia-USA Treaty, there is a similar Article that contains an 
additional requirement that the shares are traded on a recognised stock exchange. 
A complicated example of the US stance against treaty shopping is article 26 of the 
1992 USA-Netherlands Treaty.  This article has formed the basis of subsequent USA 
DTA negotiations.60  Article 26 contains a number of tests, one of which must be 
satisfied.  In the case of a company which derives income from the United States, it is 
only entitled to the reduced treaty rates if the principal class of its shares are listed on 
a recognised stock exchange located in either state, and the shares are substantially 
traded on one or more recognised stock exchanges. 
There are a number of exemptions from this test.  An important one is the activity test 
which provides that the reduced treaty rates are available if the substance of the 
business operations in the country of residence and the income in the country of 
source are connected to an active business.  
Secondly, the treaty benefits will still be available if the company is a headquarters 
company for a multinational corporate group.   
17.8 The New Zealand experience 
To date, New Zealand has not sought to insert any anti-treaty shopping provisions into 
its DTAs.  The latest DTA (New Zealand-Russia signed on 5 September 2000) does 
not contain any similar provisions to those which have been inserted by USA into its 
treaty network.  It would appear that treaty shopping is not seen as a threat to the New 
Zealand tax base.  However, the facts of Lamesa clearly demonstrate that the 
underlying methodology can be exported and readily used against the New Zealand 
tax base. 
18. CROSS-BORDER LEASING 
18.1 Background 
The specified lease regime was introduced by the Muldoon administration as part of 
the August 1982 Budget.  The regime was designed to close down two perceived 
forms of tax avoidance.  The 1981 Budget achieved this through two methods.  
Finance leases were used to circumvent the $10,000 cap on the depreciation base of 
motor vehicles. Finance leases also provided the ability to obtain a full deduction for 
prepaid lease payments.  Secondly, the regime was introduced to prevent the practice 
of loss companies selling depreciation deductions which circumvented the loss carried 
forward and grouping provisions which are now contained in Parts IG and IF of the 
Act. 
                                               
59 Trinidad, Norway, Iceland, Korea, Morocco, Egypt, Malta, United Kingdom. 
60 Treaties with the Slovak Republic, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Turkey, Austria, Thailand and South Africa. 
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18.2 Cross-border implications 
The new part FC 8A – 8I and its associated definitions do not alter the substance of 
the cross-border implications of leasing an international asset into New Zealand.   
In the context of Trans-Tasman tax reform, this regime provides Australian 
companies with a simple method of reducing New Zealand tax to either 1.34% or 
zero, and a corresponding increase in Australian company tax. 
18.3 The re-characterisation regime 
The 1982 legislation and the current regimes re-characterise the ownership rights of 
the lessor and the lessee. Under a finance lease, and the old specified lease, the lessor 
was not treated as the legal owner.  The lessee was deemed to be the legal owner of 
the asset and the lessor was deemed to be a financier.  The provisions apply 
notwithstanding anything else in the Act, and therefore the specified lease regime was 
a complete code which governed the taxation consequences of that type of lease.  The 
old Section FC 6 and the new Sections FC 8A, 8F and 8G deem the following to have 
occurred for tax purposes: 
? ? the lessor is deemed to have sold the lease asset to the lessee,  
? ? the lessee is deemed to have purchased the asset for a price equal to the 
lessor’s cost price of the asset, 
? ? the lessor is deemed to have financed the sale to the lessee by way of a 
loan to the lessee equal to the cost price of the asset, 
? ? the lessee is deemed to have used the loan to purchase the asset, 
? ? the lessor is specifically denied a deduction for depreciation in respect of 
the asset, 
? ? only the lessee is entitled to the available depreciation deductions, 
? ? the income of the lessor is deemed to be interest in respect of the loan 
made to the lessee, and 
? ? the lessee is deemed to have incurred interest expenditure equal to the 
deemed interest income of the lessor. 
18.4 The definition of a lease asset 
This definition is used for both regimes.  It is defined in section OB 1 as: 
 Any personal property which is subject to the lease, but does not  include 
any livestock or bloodstock. 
The specified lease regime only applied to personal property and could not cover a 
lease involving land.  However, in practice, this restriction has not seriously curtailed 
the scope of the regime.  For example, if the subject matter of the lease consisted of 
plant and machinery, only the external shell of the building and land would be 
excluded from the transaction. 
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18.5 The definition of a specified lease 
This was defined in section OB 1 as, inter alia, any lease with a guaranteed residual 
value.  The old specified lease regime was therefore purely optional because taxpayers 
could enter the regime by including in the lease a guaranteed residual value (GRV) of 
$1.00. 
18.6 The definition of a “finance lease” 
The definition of a “finance lease” is narrower than the old definition of a “specified 
lease”, and therefore it may be more difficult to bring an asset into the regime.  The 
test is whether: 
? ? the lease asset is transferred to the lessee at the end of the term, or 
? ? the lessee or an associate has an option to purchase the lease asset at below 
market value, or 
? ? the lease term is for more than 75% of the asset’s estimated useful life. 
In the case of previous specified leases involving infrastructure assets the method of 
making them into specified leases was to insert a GRV.  However the first two tests 
appear to be capable of manipulation to ensure the lease is treated as a finance lease. 
18.7 Guaranteed residual value 
Paragraph (a) of the definition of “specified lease” referred to a lease which had a 
GRV.  That term was defined in section OB 1 as an amount which was agreed on as 
the value of the asset at the expiry of the lease.  Secondly, the lessee guaranteed to pay 
that amount to the lessor.  A GRV was designed to cover the risk of technical 
obsolescence associated with many assets which were leased by a financial institution 
that was not prepared to carry the risk that, at the expiry of the lease, the market value 
of the asset was less than the outstanding loan balance.  The financial institution did 
not wish to take possession of the leased asset (at the termination of the lease) because 
of difficulties in disposing of the asset.  Given that in many cases the market value of 
the asset was difficult to determine, the lessee was required to guarantee a minimum 
value for the asset, binding the lessee to pay the difference if the asset sold for less 
than this sum. Invariably the GRV equalled the amount of the outstanding loan. 
It was a relatively simple exercise to circumvent that provision.  If the lessor’s 
residual value was guaranteed by a third party then that guarantee would not fall 
within the definition of a GRV as defined in section OB 1 because it was not 
guaranteed by the lessee. 
This concept is still important because the new section FC 8B(3)(a) refers to a GRV. 
18.8 Non-resident withholding tax 
In view of the approved issuer levy regime, there are clear advantages in structuring a 
cross-border lease as a specified lease.  This will ensure that the lessor can take 
advantage of the deemed income stream (in the nature of interest) which will qualify 
for the favourable AIL treatment.  However, it is possible for an Australian company 
to implement a treaty shopping structure to avoid the cost of the AIL regime.  The 
solution is to use the Dutch DTA. 
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18.9 The impact of double taxation agreements 
In many of New Zealand’s DTAs there is an unresolved tension between the royalty 
article and the interest article because the royalty article often includes payments for 
the use of industrial, commercial and scientific equipment. 
Furthermore, a number of New Zealand’s DTAs include in the interest article a 
reference to income which is assimilated to income from money lent under New 
Zealand’s domestic law.  This type of terminology is clearly a reference to the finance 
lease and old specified lease regime.  It would enable New Zealand to tax the deemed 
interest income at the higher treaty rate in any case where the lease does not qualify 
for AIL approval (which in practice is extremely unlikely). 
The Australian DTA illustrates these principles.  In the case of large cross-border 
leases, AIL can be a significant tax cost which can be solved via the Dutch DTA. 
18.10  The 1995 Australian DTA 
Article 7 contains the general rule.  An Australian enterprise is only subject to tax in 
New Zealand if the activity constitutes a permanent establishment.  Article 5 defines 
the term “permanent establishment” as including, inter alia, substantial equipment 
that is used in New Zealand by, for or under contract with an enterprise of New 
Zealand.  Consequently, there is no treaty relief available under Article 7.  However 
this leaves open treaty relief for interest or royalty income. 
Article 11(3) does not provide any effective relief because the term “interest” is 
defined as including “all other income assimilated to income from money lent by the 
law, relating to tax, of [New Zealand] in which the income arises”.   
18.11  The Impact of the Netherlands DTA 
18.11.1 Article 5 
Article 5 provides that a Dutch lessor is deemed to have created a permanent 
establishment in New Zealand if substantial equipment is in New Zealand for more 
than 12 months, and the equipment is linked to the exploitation of natural resources. 
18.11.2 Commentary on Article 5 of the definition of a PE 
In what circumstances will the presence of a lease asset, which is not linked to natural 
resources, in New Zealand create a PE?  The answer is contained in paragraph 8 of the 
OECD commentary on Article 5 (which discusses the concept of a PE).  This 
paragraph provides that where an enterprise of the Netherlands leases industrial, 
scientific or commercial equipment, without maintaining any facilities or a fixed place 
of business, the “lease facility, industrial, commercial, scientific (ICS) equipment, 
building or intangible property will not constitute a permanent establishment of the 
lessor provided the contract is limited to the mere leasing of the ICS equipment”. 
This remains the case even when, for example, the lessor supplies personnel (after 
installation) to operate the equipment provided that the responsibility of the lessor is 
limited solely to the operation or maintenance of the ICS equipment under the 
direction, responsibility and control of the lessee.  If the personnel have wider 
responsibilities that include for example, participation in the decisions regarding the 
work for which the equipment is used, or if they operate, service, inspect and maintain 
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the equipment under the responsibility and control of the lessor, the activity of the 
lessor may go beyond the mere leasing of ICS equipment and may constitute a PE. 
However, Article 7 of the Dutch DTA provides that if any other articles also apply to 
the same income, then those articles will override the positive impact of Article 7.  
Accordingly, it is necessary to ensure that neither the interest nor royalty articles 
apply.  If that is the case, then the Dutch lessor is entitled to treaty relief which means 
New Zealand cannot impose AIL. 
18.11.3 Article 11 (interest) 
Article 11(5) effectively creates treaty relief because it defines the term “interest” for 
the purposes of the treaty in a manner which cannot be interpreted as including 
deemed interest income.  For treaty purposes, “interest” is defined as income from any 
“debt claim” which includes mortgages, bonds, debentures, etc. etc. 
All commentators agree that the deemed interest is not interest for the purposes of the 
Dutch Treaty.  A similar conclusion applies in the case of royalties but the analysis is 
slightly different. 
18.11.4 Article 12 (royalties) 
This definition is similar to the definition contained in the 1995 Australian DTA.  The 
Dutch definition refers to a payment for, inter alia, the right to use any industrial, 
commercial or scientific equipment, or for information concerning industrial, 
commercial or scientific experience.  This Article would clearly encompass a Trans-
Tasman cross-border lease and, prima facie, New Zealand would have a right to tax 
the deemed interest income. 
18.11.5 Protocol 
The Dutch Treaty is unusual in that a protocol was added to it shortly after it came 
into effect on 15 October 1980.  
Protocol (ix) amends article 12 by providing that a payment for the use of scientific or 
commercial equipment is deemed to constitute income which is subject to Article 7 
(business profits) unless the payment is: 
… based on production, sales, performance or any other similar basis 
related to the use of the said equipment. 
Any cross-border Australian/Dutch lease which provides that the lessor will, for 
example, pay the stipulated lease rental on a “take or pay basis”, irrespective of the 
actual use of the lease asset, will satisfy the requirements of paragraph (ix) of the 
protocol.  Accordingly, the deemed interest income of the lessor falls outside the 
scope of Article 12 and New Zealand cannot impose tax under its domestic law. 
18.12  Conclusion 
Given that a carefully drafted cross-border lease will not create a permanent 
establishment in New Zealand, it follows that a Dutch lessor would qualify for treaty 
relief on the grounds that it has not created a PE in New Zealand and neither Article 
10 or Article 12 apply.  Consequently, the New Zealand lessee is not required to pay 
AIL. 
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19. CONCLUSIONS 
19.1 The legacy of history 
The current imputation regime discriminates against individual New Zealand 
shareholders who have invested in Australian companies which in turn derive New 
Zealand-sourced income.  Triangular taxation is a feature of, inter alia, the banking 
and insurance industry which are dominated by companies like ANZ, AMP, AXA, 
NBA, Tower and Westpac.  The two previous attempts to solve the problem have 
failed. 
Triangular taxation is not an accident of history.  The current dilemma is the direct 
result of a series of deliberate policy choices made in 1987 and 1988 which were 
discussed in numerous reports from the Consultative Committees that examined, inter 
alia, the design parameters of the current imputation and international tax regimes.  
Those reports consistently alluded to the risk to the New Zealand tax base of 
permitting imputation credits to flow through to New Zealand shareholders via 
dividends received from non-resident companies which had received a dividend 
sourced from their New Zealand subsidiary.  
The commercial world has changed since 1987.  Companies such as BIL and Lion 
Nathan are no longer New Zealand residents, and Australia is not a tax haven.   
19.2 The best solution 
The best alternative, from a New Zealand individual shareholder’s perspective, is 
streaming.  However, this has been rejected by both governments who prefer the pro 
rata allocation solution.  If the latest initiative fails to produce a feasible solution, the 
problem will not go away.  Trans-Tasman companies will continue to devise 
strategies that provide ad hoc solutions that reflect the commercial environment 
within which they operate. 
19.3 Behavioural implications 
The binding rulings obtained by ANZ and Westpac highlighted the kinds of 
commercial solutions which are likely to become more prevalent if the pro rata 
allocation model becomes law.  There are numerous other debt/equity solutions which 
will often appeal to companies who do not need to raise additional capital. 
The “deficiencies” in Australian pre-CGT treaties clearly demonstrate how it is 
possible for New Zealand resident companies to put in place tax effective investment 
strategies that enable them to reduce the creation of Australian franking credits.  
Lamesa structures are a good example of how Trans-Tasman companies can exploit 
any loopholes in domestic and international tax law to alleviate the negative impact 
that the current tax regimes have on their individual shareholders. 
Finally, New Zealand’s existing network of DTAs does not contain any articles which 
would prevent Australian companies from taking advantage of employee secondment 
structures, or cross-border leasing.  Given the limited appeal of the pro rata allocation 
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model, it is highly unlikely that the preferred solution will lead to any significant 
reduction in the pursuit of Trans-Tasman corporate tax solutions to the problem of 
double taxation which was deliberately created to prevent NZ companies trying to 
circumvent the CFC and FIF regimes. That horse has already bolted, yet the stable 
door still remains firmly locked. 
 
David Dunbar, 01 June 2003.  
